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Despite the importance of business creation for the economy and a relevant share of new
firms being started out of unemployment, most research has focused on analyzing the
effect of unemployment insurance (UI) policies on re-employment outcomes that ignore
self-employment. In this paper, we assess how UI benefit duration affects the motivation for
creating a startup while unemployed and the subsequent firms’ success. To do so, we create
a comprehensive dataset on founders in Germany that links administrative social insurance
with survey data. Exploiting reform- and age-based exogenous variations in potential
benefit duration (PBD) within the German UI system, we find that longer PBD leads to
longer actual unemployment duration for those becoming self-employed. Furthermore,
the UI duration elasticity for these individuals is higher than common estimates for those
individuals becoming re-employed. With increasing unemployment benefit duration, the
founders’ outcomes in terms of self-assessed motivation, sales, and employment growth
lessen. This overall causal effect of PBD can be rationalized with a mix of composition
and individual-level duration effects. Therefore, our findings suggest that it is important to
consider the fiscal externality of UI on startup success when it comes to the (optimal) design
of UI systems.
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1 Introduction
Business creation plays an important economic role in stimulating productivity, fostering struc-
tural change, and, foremost, generating jobs for the founders and their employees (Aghion et al.,
2009; Dent et al., 2016; Haltiwanger et al., 2013). Self-employment accounts for 10-15 percent
of the labor force in most OECD countries, and self-employment arising from unemployment is
important economically, as one quarter of all new businesses is started out of unemployment.1
The popularity of policy tools that promote startup activity by the unemployed in order to pave
the way out of economic crises (such as the one currently beginning as a result of the global
Covid-19 pandemic) may even lead to more startups arising from unemployment in the near
future. On a more permanent basis, the spread of new forms of employment in the digital
economy (e.g. Uber drivers) will most likely further increase the relevance of transitions from
unemployment to self-employment. Recent research in public economics demonstrates that the
generosity of unemployment insurance (UI) systems in terms of potential benefit duration (PBD)
and benefit levels affects the re-employment outcomes of those transitioning from unemployment
to (dependent) employment. Despite their economic importance, however, transitions from
unemployment to self-employment (business creations) are largely ignored and little is known
about how the design of UI affects the behavior of potential entrepreneurs and the subsequent
performance of their firms. Therefore, our paper sheds light on this topic by analyzing how the
potential UI benefit duration affects the actual unemployment duration of those transitioning to
self-employment, their motivations for starting firms, and the success of their firms in terms of
sales and employment growth.2
The effect of longer PBD on self-employment outcomes seems unclear a priori. On the
one hand, when longer PBD incentivizes longer actual unemployment, losses in financial,
social, and human capital might lead to a gradual decrease in startup quality. For instance,
1For instance, according to Spanish administrative data, up to 50 percent of startups founded between 2005-2017
were started out of unemployment (Camarero Garcia and Hansch, 2020). According to our data, in Germany, the
empirical setting of this paper, around 25-30 percent of all founders between 2005-2015 were unemployed directly
before starting their firms. According to data from the Mannheim Enterprise Panel on Germany, there were, on
average, around 200,000 startups each year between 2000 and 2015. This total corresponds to about 50,000-60,000
startups arising from unemployment per year. A considerable fraction of these startups will employ additional
personnel. Since it has been shown that startups often recruit previously unemployed workers (Coad et al., 2017),
the absolute importance of startups arising from unemployment for transitions out of unemployment can be expected
to be even higher. Hence, though self-employment accounts for a smaller fraction of the total labor force than
dependent employment, new firms can be considered incubators of (re)-employment (Haltiwanger et al., 2013).
2Concerning the notation in our paper: when discussing self-employment, we refer to labor market status to
distinguish unemployment, employment and self-employment. Within the labor market status of self-employment,
the term founder refers to the person starting a firm and covers both firms with and without employees. The term
entrepreneur is used to focus on a founder who continues to run a firm after starting it. The term startup refers to
the act of starting a firm and is used as a synonym for the new firm.
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longer unemployment duration could decrease financial means, increase difficulties in attracting
external financial capital (due to decreasing collateral or stigmatization), lead to losses in
business contacts, or lead to a depreciation of skills and knowledge. On the other hand, a period
of unemployment might be used to better prepare for self-employment, e.g. by acquiring new
skills or developing market entry strategies. Apart from these individual-level duration effects,
there are likely to be composition effects, as individuals with high motivation and ability can be
expected to leave unemployment the fastest. Thus, with longer unemployment duration, a higher
number of individuals with low ability and motivation could remain to found startups. In our
study, we identify the overall causal effect of potential UI benefit duration on startup success
and thus the (net) result of the government’s UI policy. We rationalize which mechanisms could
explain our results with the help of post-hoc analyses and a formalized job search model.
In this paper, we construct a dataset that links a representative panel survey of founders in
Germany to administrative data on their own and their employees’ labor market histories. Hence,
we obtain a comprehensive linked employer-employee dataset for founders. Due to their high
level of detail, German administrative data on labor market histories have been widely used
in research (e.g. von Wachter and Bender, 2006; Dustmann et al., 2009), allowing for good
comparability of our measures with those used in previous research in the context of transitions
to dependent employment. Our data enable us to consider two types of outcome variables,
founders’ self-assessments, as measured by their motivation to start a business (necessity-
/opportunity-driven entrepreneurship), and their objectively measurable outcomes, such as sales
and employment growth during the first years of business. We focus on startup growth as an
outcome to allow for a clear attribution of the measured effects. Growth potential in the early
years is a major predictor of firms’ long-term success (Sedláček and Sterk, 2017) and should be
more directly influenced by unemployment duration than more distant outcomes.
To identify the causal effects of unemployment benefit duration on startup success, we
exploit exogenous variation through both policy reforms of PBD, and age-specific cutoffs in the
PBD schedule for German unemployment insurance (UI). Our main empirical strategy is the
Instrumental Variable (IV) approach. We instrument potential (and actual) unemployment benefit
duration with the interaction term “being in the relevant age cohort” (only those above 45 years
old were affected by reforms) and “becoming unemployed after the reform-changed maximum
PBD”. The reforms of 2006 and 2008 jointly reduced the maximum PBD by at least six months
for affected cohorts. Our IV approach entails features of both Difference-in-Differences (DiD)
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and Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) strategies. In general, the results remain robust
when conducting an RDD to estimate the effect induced by age cutoffs in the PBD schedule or a
DiD approach based on the policy reforms.
Our results reveal a negative overall causal effect of longer PBD on startup success. More
specifically, our estimates suggest that longer PBD increases the actual unemployment duration
of future founders, implying an UI duration elasticity of around 0.6. This estimate is higher
compared to recent estimates suggested by literature focusing on dependent re-employment (e.g.
Schmieder and von Wachter, 2016, find an elasticity of 0.15 for Germany). Via this channel of
longer actual unemployment duration, longer PBD significantly increases the likelihood that
individuals start firms out of necessity – compared to situations in which they start firms due to
opportunity motives – by about two percent per month of PBD. Moreover, and foremost in the
non-manufacturing sectors, we find consistent evidence for a negative effect of longer PBD on
actual outcomes in terms of employment and sales growth in the first two years after starting up.
These overall causal effects of PBD can be driven by individual-level duration effects,
composition effects, or a mix of both. We illustrate this situation using a stylized search model
in Section 5. Empirically, we find limited evidence for composition effects in the observable
characteristics of unemployed founders in response to UI policy changes. Hence, our findings
suggest that the net effect is mostly driven by individual-level duration effects, i.e. the ability
of individuals to succeed as entrepreneurs steadily decreases during unemployment spells. For
instance, access to credit may deteriorate with longer unemployment duration and thus financially
constrain the respective startups’ growth potential. The results indicate that by setting the length
of PBD, the government can affect the quality of firms started out of unemployment. Therefore,
changes in PBD may induce considerable fiscal externalities (Lawson, 2017) affecting the cost-
benefit analysis of the UI system. Furthermore, the effect of PBD on startup success should also
be considered when analyzing the value of UI for self-employment (cf. Hombert et al., 2020).
Our study makes three major contributions. First, we document how the PBD in the un-
employment inusrance affects the actual unemployment duration for a future entrepreneur. In
this context, it is ex-ante unclear whether the positive causal effect of PBD on actual UI benefit
duration – which is usually found for those becoming re-employed as wage workers – also exists
for those starting a business (and whether we should expect similar effect sizes). This question
has direct implications for the cost of UI systems since, if it exists, additional fiscal externalities
must then be considered due to transitions from unemployment to self-employment.
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Second, we provide evidence as to how the UI policy affects the motivation of founders,
i.e. whether they start a firm due to a business opportunity or out of necessity (as a last resort).
In this manner, our study illustrates how UI policies can serve as tools to maximize the share
of opportunity-driven startups. These types of startups typically have the highest potential for
generating long-term economic value (e.g. through innovation or growth). Our results further
suggest that self-classifications in terms of motivation can serve as important indicators for the
future potential of startups and are therefore worthy of attention in themselves.
Third, we facilitate an understanding of how the growth potential (success) of startups in
terms of employment generation and sales depends on UI policy. This understanding is important
for the optimal design of UI programs since it affects their cost-benefit ratios. There are also
implications for the optimal design of active labor market policies which incentivize unemployed
individuals to start a business, especially in terms of when such policies should be used. Thus,
our results are informative for nascent entrepreneurs, money lenders, and policy makers.
With its research focus, our paper connects several strands of the literature on entrepreneur-
ship and public economics which have thus far evolved in parallel to each other. First, research
on entrepreneurship has investigated potential determinants for becoming a firm founder (e.g.
Cagetti and De Nardi, 2006; Berglann et al., 2011; Levine and Rubinstein, 2017). Stylized
facts suggest that unemployment increases the propensity to become self-employed (e.g. Evans
and Leighton, 1990a,b; Meager, 1992; Blanchflower and Meyer, 1994; Kuhn and Schuetze,
2001; Andersson and Wadensjö, 2007; von Greiff, 2009; Røed and Skogstrøm, 2014a,b) but that
previously unemployed founders perform more poorly in entrepreneurship than those transition-
ing from dependent employment (e.g. Andersson and Wadensjö, 2007). However, most of the
entrepreneurship literature so far has treated previously unemployed founders as one group and
largely ignored significant heterogeneity among the unemployed in terms of their unemployment
durations, their motivations for starting a business and their firms’ success. In addition, the issue
of necessity- versus opportunity-driven entrepreneurship has only been discussed in the context of
very specific active labor market policies (e.g. Caliendo and Künn, 2011; Caliendo and Kritikos,
2010, in the case of startup subsidies) but not in the more important context of the general UI
system. In studying the effects of PBD on the timing involved in unemployed individuals moving
(or being pushed) into self-employment (including its subsequent outcomes), we contribute to
the entrepreneurship literature by providing evidence for the potential implications of the UI
system on the success of firms started by unemployed individuals.
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Second, this project also adds to the literature on public economics in terms of the opti-
mal design of unemployment insurance (UI) by providing evidence for the effect of PBD on
future entrepreneurs. The public economics literature has discussed several aspects concerning
the optimal design of UI policies, i.e. the level of benefits and their potential duration (e.g.
Hopenhayn and Nicolini, 1997; Katz and Meyer, 1990a,b; Lalive et al., 2006; Lalive, 2008;
Schmieder et al., 2012, 2016; Kolsrud et al., 2018). Its focus has been on investigating effects on
subsequent employment outcomes, predominantly re-employment wages (e.g. Le Barbanchon,
2016; Schmieder et al., 2016; Le Barbanchon et al., 2019; Nekoei and Weber, 2017). Results
suggest that increases in PBD lead to increases in actual unemployment duration. However, the
effects of longer actual unemployment on re-employment wages remain disputed. For instance,
Nekoei and Weber (2017) argue that longer PBD can either induce delays in job acceptance
(and simply subsidize leisure) or improve job opportunities (through subsidizing a longer search
that results in job matches of higher quality). While Nekoei and Weber (2017) find that the
latter positive effect dominates in Austria, Schmieder et al. (2016) report negative effects of
unemployment duration on re-employment wages in Germany. We contribute to this debate by
providing evidence of the causal effect of unemployment benefit duration on self-employment
outcomes based on our newly created dataset. Thus, our paper complements the analysis of UI
benefits with respect to post-unemployment outcomes (Jarosch and Pilossoph, 2019).
We proceed as follows: in Section 2, we explain our dataset construction and conduct a
descriptive analysis. Section 3 illustrates the institutional background and our identification
strategies for deriving causal effects. In Section 4, we present our empirical estimates, which we
rationalize in a stylized model in Section 5. Section 6 provides our conclusion.
2 Data and Descriptive Analysis
2.1 Dataset
For this paper’s empirical analysis, we construct data that match the employer information
provided in the IAB/ZEW Start-Up Panel with employee register data from the German Federal
Employment Agency. In this way, we circumvent data limitations since German administrative
social security employer-employee linked data normally do not contain any information on
self-employed individuals. Unlike regular dependent employees, self-employed individuals in
Germany are not obliged to contribute to the public social security system.
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The IAB/ZEW Start-Up Panel is a joint research project of the Institute for Employment
Research of the German Federal Employment Agency (IAB), the Leibniz Centre for European
Economic Research (ZEW), and Creditreform, Germany’s largest credit rating agency (see
Fryges et al., 2010, for details on the sample design of the dataset). The Start-Up Panel is a
stratified random sample taken from the Mannheim Enterprise Panel (“MUP”), which contains
basic information on almost all firms in Germany, including startups (Bersch et al., 2014).3 It
provides comprehensive data on young firms from almost all industries (the primary sector, public
sector and energy sector are excluded). Information is collected by means of a yearly telephone
survey (computer-aided telephone interviews, CATI). The sample of the IAB/ZEW Start-Up
Panel is stratified by the year of firm formation and by industry sector. Stratification is controlled
for by including dummy variables for the stratification cells in all regressions. Currently, the
IAB/ZEW Start-Up Panel contains data on more than 21,000 firms founded between 2005-2015.4
The linked register data are “Integrated Employment Biographies” provided by the German
Federal Employment Agency. These administrative data yield information on the start and end
dates of all employment and unemployment spells in the founders’ (and the startup employees’)
employment histories and their potential unemployment benefit durations. The data are reported
by the employing establishment, collected by the social insurance agencies, and processed by
the employment agency. Due to their high level of detail, the data are widely used in scientific
research (e.g. von Wachter and Bender, 2006; Dustmann et al., 2009; Schmieder et al., 2016).
We match the founders’ and the startup employees’ employment histories from the German
Federal Employment Agency with the firm-level data from the IAB/ZEW Start-Up Panel with
text search algorithm methods. Thus, we obtain the most representative employer-employee
linked dataset for founders in Germany as of this date. Our matched dataset covers longitudinal
information on approximately 18,000 startups.5
3The underlying firm information is collected and provided by Creditreform, which maintains this data to
conduct credit ratings for nearly all firms in Germany.
4The first survey wave was conducted in 2008 and collected data on firms founded between 2005 to 2007. In
the first years of data collection efforts, the Start-Up Panel dataset was financed jointly by ZEW, Creditreform and
KfW bank, Germany’s state-owned development bank, which administers a large part of the federal SME support
programs in Germany. Therefore, the sample of startup cohorts until the year 2012 was also stratified by whether or
not support was received from KfW. As for the other stratification criteria, sector and year of foundation, we control
for these stratifications with dummy variables in all regressions as well.
5We could match labor market histories of about 80% of the founders from the IAB/ZEW Start-Up Panel based
on their names, birth dates, and additional geographical information. Given that not all founders were employed, i.e.
subject to social insurance in Germany previously (e.g. as they have always been self-employed), this is a very high
ratio of matched individuals. Moreover, we were able to match establishment data to about 90% of those startups
that self-reported (during an interview) employees subject to registration with the German social insurance based on
the establishments’ names and addresses. For details on the construction of our dataset, see Appendix B.
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2.2 Descriptive Analysis
For the aim of this study, we focus on the approximately 12,000 cases in which the firm was
started by a single founder (as opposed to a team). We concentrate on single founders because
our aim is to isolate the effects of individual unemployment duration on firm outcomes. Such an
effect can be hardly identified for teams of founders, as e.g. only one of the founders might have
been unemployed before starting up or all founders were unemployed but for different durations.
Moreover, our dataset includes non-team founders that have and do not have employees. In
the main empirical analysis, we focus on roughly 1,300 firms whose non-team-founders were
unemployed directly before starting their firms. They were between 35 and 65 years of age when
entering unemployment, and became unemployed before some major reforms led to changes in
the availability of startup subsidies for the unemployed in 2012. We only include individuals for
which all required information on control variables is available and who had collected enough
contribution months to be entitled to receive benefits for the maximum PBD.
Detailed summary statistics for all variables are shown in Table 1, i.e. for our regression
sample of previously unemployed founders, for those founders with above median unemployment
duration as well as for a reference group of previously employed founders. The founders are
typically male (85%) and of German origin (94%). They have on average 17 years of experience
in the industry in which they started firms, and most of them (85%) had never been self-employed
prior to entering unemployment. The founders are, on average, 44.44 years old, and about 39%
of them became unemployed when they were at least 45 years old (and hence belong to the
treatment group in the subsequent causal analysis). In terms of education, 28% of founders
achieved university degrees, and 13% of them held managerial positions in the five years before
starting up. With, on average, a PBD of 12.32 months, their mean actual unemployment duration
was 4.79 months prior to entering self-employment.
Figure 1 shows the outcomes in terms of employment and sales per year for all the (non-team)
entrepreneurs in the relevant age range in the linked dataset. Figure 2 compares outcomes of all
entrepreneurs in our sample, distinguishing those who started their business out of unemployment
with those that became entrepreneurs without having been unemployed.6 The results show large
differences between the two groups in terms of full-time equivalent (FTE) employment and
6As explained in Section 2.1 and in the footnotes accompanying the figures, we focus on non-team founders
that are 35 to 65 years old. All firms are included, independent of the survival length. The graphs look almost
identical when we condition on firms that survive at least three or five years, providing evidence that differences in
growth measures are not driven by differences in survival. These graphs are available upon request.
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sales. Having been unemployed before starting a firm is associated with inferior outcomes as an
entrepreneur from the very beginning and cannot be compensated for over the first seven years in
business. After entering self-employment out of employment, founders start with average yearly
sales of about 370,000 Euro and increase their yearly sales by an average of about 100,000 Euro
over the first seven years in business. In contrast, founders who were previously unemployed
start with sales of about 150,000 Euro a year and despite relatively stronger, concave-shaped
sales growth over the first seven years in business, never come close to catching up (average
yearly sales increase from about 150,000 to 300,000 Euro over the first seven years). Similarly,
while founders coming out of unemployment show stronger relative employment growth in
terms of FTE employment over the first seven years, they come never close to catching up with
founders who were previously not unemployed (for unemployed founders: FTE employment
increases from about 0.5 to 1.5 employees; for not unemployed founders: FTE employment
increases from about 1 to 2 employees.).
Zooming in on those founders entering self-employment out of unemployment, Figure 3
compares the outcomes of the previously unemployed entrepreneurs in our sample, split at the
median unemployment duration. The results show large differences between the two groups
from the beginning that increase further over time in terms of both FTE employment and sales
per year. Longer prior unemployment duration before starting a firm seems to be associated with
inferior outcomes as an entrepreneur that are not yet visible to their full extent in the year of
foundation but develop over the first years of a firm’s existence. Hence, our descriptive results
indicate that a large part of the outcome differentials between previously unemployed and not
unemployed founders are driven by unemployed founders with long unemployment durations.
Besides sales and employment outcomes, our dataset also allows an assessment that comes
closer to the roots of individual decision making and success by providing information on the
founders’ motives for starting up. During the first interview, i.e. closest possible to the date of
startup to prevent bias, founders were asked to categorize their main motivation to start up the
business. Table 2 shows how we categorize the motives for starting up into either necessity-driven
or opportunity-driven.7 We classify the motives “self-determined working”, the “realization
of a business idea”, as well as “better earning potential” as indicators of opportunity-driven
7Figure A.1 in Appendix A shows that necessity-driven founders start up more often just before UI benefits
expire and thus appear to be pushed into self-employment. Table 1 shows that one third of previously unemployed
non-team founders indicate that they were pushed into self-employment. Note that our notion of pushed entrepreneur
also corresponds to its usage in Bianchi (2012). The observation of a spike just before exhausting UI benefits has
been studied by Card et al. (2007) and recently been documented for Germany by DellaVigna et al. (2020).
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entrepreneurship. In contrast, we classify the motives “no suitable employment options” and
“escape from unemployment” as indicators of necessity-driven or pushed entrepreneurship.8
Figure 4 compares outcomes of all non-team founders in our dataset, i.e. those with and
those without a history of unemployment, split by their self-reported startup motivations (i.e.
whether they classify as opportunity- or necessity-driven/pushed founders). The graphs reveal
that founders who report an opportunity-driven motivation for starting their business experience
faster growth in sales and FTE employment, suggesting that the motive for starting up is already
a good predictor of subsequent startup success and that defining groups of entrepreneurs along
the lines of their motivation seems adequate for describing observable differences in longer-
term growth potential. Analogously, Figure 5 compares the same outcomes among just the
previously unemployed founders in our main regression sample. Again, we find considerable
differences between opportunity-driven and necessity-driven/pushed entrepreneurs in terms of
FTE employment and sales. Starting a business out of unemployment with a necessity motivation
is associated with poorer outcomes over the self-employment spell compared to launching a firm
(out of unemployment) having been motivated by a business opportunity.
OLS regressions of being classified as necessity-driven (pushed) entrepreneur, of sales and
of FTE employment (one and two years after having started the business) on the actual benefit
duration (and numerous covariates) suggest that the graphically observed correlations are quite
robust. The relationships revealed in the descriptive analysis (as discussed in the five figures
above) remain significant in the OLS models even after controlling for individual labor market
experience, education, gender, nationality, and year as well as industry fixed effects (see Table 3
for details on the industry classification). This simple regression analysis suggests that one
additional month of actual unemployment duration is associated with a 1.7 percentage point
increase in the likelihood of being pushed into entrepreneurship (see Table 4: five percent in
relative terms, given an original basis of about 35% necessity-driven entrepreneurs). Moreover,
one month of actual benefit duration is significantly correlated with a decrease in sales and
FTE employment (Table 4). These results are reconfirmed when focusing on startups in non-
manufacturing sectors (75% of our sample, see Table 5). Non-manufacturing sectors offer less
restricted market entry due to lower initial investment requirements; thus, they are the most
relevant for the entry of founders transitioning from unemployment to self-employment.
8Since the item “better earning potential” could be alternatively interpreted as pointing to a necessity motive,
we double-checked all results by excluding founders who self-reported this motivation category. All results remain
robust. Note that the surveyed persons could only select one answer category as their main motive for starting up.
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We conclude from our descriptive analyses that there is a statistically significant relationship
between actual unemployment duration and subsequent self-employment outcomes in our data.
In particular, starting a business out of unemployment is associated with poorer outcomes in
terms of sales and employment when compared to businesses started by founders who have
not been previously unemployed. Moreover, given a previous unemployment history, a longer
duration of unemployment correlates with a necessity-driven motivation for starting up (or pushed
entrepreneurship) and subsequently leads to poorer firm outcomes.
3 Institutions and Empirical Strategy
The goal of this paper is to find out whether PBD causally affects the actual unemployment
duration for founders who start up out of unemployment and whether, in consequence, actual
unemployment duration causally affects the motivation for starting a business out of unemploy-
ment as well as subsequent firm outcomes. The main identification challenges lie in the fact that
an individual’s potential and actual unemployment duration are likely to be non-random, which
leads to endogeneity concerns. For instance, strategic behavior may be involved in becoming
unemployed under the better PBD scheme conditions. Moreover, PBD (or actual unemployment
duration) may be correlated with characteristics of unemployed people (e.g. previous working
experience) that in fact explain the observed outcome. To solve these identification issues, we
exploit policy reform- and an age cutoff-based exogenous variation in the PBD schedule within
the German UI system.
We use an instrumental variables (IV) approach as our main estimation strategy and check
the robustness of our results by further conducting a RDD and a DiD approach. These strategies
allow us to derive the net causal effect of PBD on the actual UI duration elasticity of founders, the
motivation to become self-employed, and objective measures of startup success. Therefore, we
identify the overall effect of a change in the policy variable, PBD, on entrepreneurial outcomes.
Since PBD might affect entrepreneurial outcomes through either composition effects in the pool of
unemployed individuals or individual-level duration effects, we try to disentangle both channels
in post-hoc analyses. As a start, we explain the main institutional features the identification
strategies rely upon.
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3.1 Institutional Background: German UI System and Reforms
In general, individuals in Germany who lose a job through no fault of their own are entitled to
UI benefits (“Arbeitlosengeld I”) if they satisfy certain eligibility constraints. These eligibility
constraints require UI benefit claimants to have made social insurance contributions for at least 12
months within the two years (three years before February 2006) prior to becoming unemployed.
The replacement rate is 60 percent of previous after-tax (net) earnings (67 percent if a person has
dependent children) and has not changed since 1995. After exhausting UI benefits, an individual
can obtain social security benefits tied to the existential minimum (“Arbeitslosengeld II”), which
is subject to annual means testing.9
The PBD depends, first, on an individual’s age at the start of the unemployment spell, and,
second, on the number of months worked in jobs subject to social insurance contributions
(contribution months) within a defined time period before claiming UI benefits (the coverage
constraint was seven years prior to February 2006 and five years afterwards). For all workers
satisfying the eligibility constraints, the PBD consists of a minimum of six months collected
through at least the 12 contribution months in the time period just before the UI spell starts
(Table 6). For each four additional contribution months before starting an UI spell, the PBD
increases by two months. However, workers younger than 45 years are restricted to a maximum
PBD of 12 months, which corresponds to 24 months of contributions, i.e. they cannot get
more than 12 months of PBD if they have collected more than 24 contribution months. This
maximum PBD cutoff increases with the age. For instance, before February 2006, for workers
45 and older at the start of their UI spell, 30 months of contribution led to 15 months of PBD
(Table 6). Workers 57 and older could reach the maximum PBD of 32 months with 64 months of
contributions. Hence, they could acquire 20 more months of PBD compared to a worker younger
than 45 years who had also contributed 64 months before entering UI in the same month.
While the PBD schedule has remained stable for workers that enter UI at ages younger than
45, the maximum PBD cutoffs changed for individuals over 45 years in age in February 2006
and a second time in January 2008. Each reform affected those individuals entering UI after
its implementation, whereas already unemployed individuals were still treated according to the
rules in place in the month in which they entered UI.
9In line with our data analysis focusing on the years 2005-2015, we describe the German UI system as it has
existed since 2005 in the main text. Appendix C.1 provides more details on the most important labor market reforms
that took place in Germany during the early 2000s.
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Table 7 summarizes the eligibility criteria and changes resulting from the different reforms.10
The reform of 2006 led to a considerable reduction in the maximum PBD for those 45 years and
older. The reform of 2008 led to a comparatively small (readjustment) increase in the maximum
PBD for some age cohorts over 50 years. In total, the net reform effect when comparing the time
period before February 2006 to that after January 2008 can be characterized by a reduction of at
least six months in the maximum PBD for all age cohorts entering the UI system at 45 years and
older (Table 7).
3.2 Main Empirical Strategy: Instrumental Variable (IV) Strategy
The identifying variation that we exploit in our three empirical estimation models stems from
the age-dependent discontinuities in PBD (Table 6) and from the two reforms regarding the
maximum PBD schedule which took place in 2006 and 2008 (Table 7).11 Our main empirical
models follow the instrumental variable (IV) approach used in Le Barbanchon et al. (2019).
The idea is to exploit the fact that the PBD in the German UI system depends on age-cut offs
and that there have been reforms that changed the PBD but no other parameters, such as the
UI benefit levels. Therefore, instrumenting PBD (or actual unemployment benefit duration) by
an interaction between the reform and the age cutoff constitutes a valid instrument. It should
introduce variation in benefit duration and satisfy the exclusion restriction because the differences
in outcomes among individuals are unlikely to be explained by just small differentials in age
(under or over the age cutoff) and the time at which individuals became unemployed (before or
after the reform). We estimate IV models of the form:
yit = α +β ∗Treatedit + γ ∗PBDit +δ ∗Xit + yeart + εit (1)
yit = α +β ∗Treatedit + γ ∗AUDit +δ ∗Xit + yeart + εit (2)
where, for each founder i in month t, y is the outcome variable which can be the motivation
for starting a firm, logarithmized yearly sales in Euro in the first and in the second year after
foundation, or the logarithmized FTE number of employees one year and two years after founda-
10For an overview of the reforms of the German UI benefit system before the time period studied in this paper,
see Schmieder et al. (2012). For the time period studied in this paper, see Price (2019) and Appendix C.1.
11To the best of our knowledge, no startup subsidies in Germany depend on a founder’s age. While there was a
change in the scheme for startup subsidies in 2006, first, we also use the 2008 reform for identification when relying
on reform-based variations in PBD, and second, the age-dependent discontinuities that we exploit for identification
are independent of subsidy reforms. Thus, we are confident that our source of variation is not correlated to any
changes occurring in startup subsidies for the unemployed (compare Appendix C.2). Moreover, we control for
participation in subsidy schemes that are either governed by the German Federal Employment Agency or the KfW
bank in all regressions and therefore account for all major startup subsidies in Germany.
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tion. Moreover, α is a constant, and X is a vector of firm- and founder-specific control variables
(education, managerial experience, self-employment experience, industry experience, gender,
being subsidized, industry-fixed effects). Finally, we control for macroeconomic conditions and
trends in the unemployment or self-employment rate by taking into account year-fixed effects.12
Depending on the model , the potential benefit duration (PBDit) and the actual unemployment
duration (AUDit) are instrumented by the instrumental variables:
– IV06=After(02/2006)*Treated(age≥45) which reflects the effect of a decrease in PBD by
at least 6 months and/or
– IV08=After(01/2008)*Treated(50≤age≤54) which reflects the effect of an increase in
PBD by at least 3 months.
This set-up leads to the first-stage of the instrumental variable (IV) models:
PBDit = α +β ∗Treatedit + γ ∗ IV 06 (+γ ∗ IV 08)+δ ∗Xit + yeart + εit (3)
AUDit = α +β ∗Treatedit + γ ∗ IV 06 (+γ ∗ IV 08)+δ ∗Xit + yeart + εit (4)
The first-stage models can be regarded as tests of the strength of our instrumental variables
(see Table 10 to Table A.4). F-statistics from our first-stage models for PBD generally suggest
that our instruments are very strong predictors of PBDit , with Equation (3) yielding high F-
statistics for the instruments, i.e. most F-statistic values are above 100 and never less than 10
in any specification. Moreover, one would expect the corresponding first-stage F-statistics to
be smaller when instrumenting the actual employment duration (AUDit in Equation (4)). The
IV should have a first-order correlation with the policy variable that changed due to the reforms
(PBD) and only a second-order correlation with the actual unemployment duration. Consequently,
when we use our IVs to instrument the actual unemployment duration — which we do in order
to understand how changes in PBD affect subsequent outcomes of unemployed individuals in
self-employment through changes in actual unemployment duration — the F-statistics are clearly
smaller. However, they always remain above 10, which is the commonly used rule of thumb for
F-statistics used to identify weak instruments.
Our IV estimator is best interpreted as the local average treatment effect of PBD or actual
unemployment duration on our outcomes. This interpretation is similar to the interpretation of
the IV approach used in Schmieder et al. (2016) for estimating the wage effect for unemployed
individuals becoming re-employed as dependent employees. Our IV approach exploits both
12We tested taking out observations from January 2006 so that the year effects fully capture the after-reform
dummy. Following this approach does not alter our results.
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reform- and age-cutoff-based exogenous variation in order to estimate the causal effect of
PBD on actual unemployment duration, the motivation for starting a business, and on startup
success. Nonetheless, we also present results from plain RDD and DiD estimation approaches
as robustness checks. By estimating an RDD, we isolate the effects of exploiting only the age
cutoffs in the PBD schedule to derive their local average treatment effect (see Section 4.2.1). By
running a DiD strategy, we only rely on the reforms in the PBD schedule to estimate their average
treatment effect (see Section 4.2.3). Since it unites the exogenous variation in the explanatory
variable used in the RDD and DiD approaches, we argue that estimates from our IV strategy
have higher external validity compared to estimates from plain RDD or DiD approaches.
4 Results
We begin by presenting OLS baseline estimates of the effect of our main explanatory variable,
potential benefit duration (PBD), on the actual unemployment duration, on the motivation for
starting a business, and on subsequent firm outcomes (see Table 8). In all regressions, we control
for education, previous labor market experience, individual characteristics (gender, nationality),
industry, and year-fixed effects. We also include dummy variables indicating whether founders
received subsidies from the Federal Employment Agency and/or the KfW bank to control for any
unobserved heterogeneity related to startup subsidies (see also Appendix C.2). The OLS results
indicate that a one month increase in PBD comes with an increase in actual unemployment
duration of 0.47 months. Hence, we estimate a duration elasticity of about 0.5. Moreover, one
month of additional PBD is associated with an increase in the probability of starting a business
out of necessity by about two percentage points. Concerning firm outcomes, more PBD leads
to fewer sales and FTE employment in the first two years after starting up. Turning to the
coefficients of the control variables, more highly educated individuals tend to be less likely to
start a business out of self-reported necessity. Previous managerial experience contributes to
better performance in terms of sales and employment growth. Being female or a foreigner does
not have any differential effect concerning actual unemployment duration or the motivation for
starting a business. If at all, these two characteristics may be associated with lower sales growth.
We generally present results for all sectors, as well as results for just non-manufacturing
sectors in this section (e.g. OLS baseline estimates for non-manufacturing firms are shown in
Table 9). We do so since non-manufacturing sectors are of particular relevance for market entry
by unemployed individuals because entry into these sectors usually requires comparably lower
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initial investment. Therefore, focusing on non-manufacturing sectors allows us to abstract from
investment-driven unobserved heterogeneity. Importantly, our results for the full and restricted
samples are fully consistent. Results obtained with the restricted non-manufacturing sample
(about 75% of firms) are generally more precisely estimated.
4.1 Main Results: Instrumental Variable (IV) Approach
We present the results from our main IV models, as outlined in the methods Section 3, in
Tables 10 and 11 as well as Tables 12 and 13. For these main results, we use “being treated by
the policy reform of 2006” as an instrument for longer PBD and longer actual unemployment
duration. Tables A.1 and A.2 as well as Tables A.3 and A.4 show results when using the two
instrumental variables “being treated by the reform of 2006” and “being treated by the reform of
2008”.
The IV estimates suggest that longer PBD causally increases actual unemployment duration
before individuals transfer from unemployment to self-employment. Prior research has con-
firmed this result only with respect to re-employment as a dependent worker. Via longer actual
unemployment duration, longer PBD increases the probability that individuals start a company
out of necessity (and not because they see a business opportunity). Subsequently, longer PBD
leads to a decrease in firm performance in terms of employment and sales over the initial years
in business. Turning to the effect sizes, according to our IV estimates, a one month increase in
the PBD leads to a 0.6 month increase in the actual unemployment duration before starting up
(column two of Table 10). Moreover, one additional month of PBD leads to a 1.5 percentage
points higher probability of starting a firm out of necessity. Given that the average probability
of starting a firm out of necessity is around 35 percent, this increase corresponds to a relative
increase of four percent per month, which is economically significant (column three of Table 10).
Concerning the effects on more objective outcomes, we find that only the effect on sales after
two years remains statistically significant in the full sample in the IV setting. A one-month
increase in the PBD leads to 7.2 percent lower sales in the second year. The effect of longer
PBD on employment after two years is negative, as it was in the OLS models, but it is less
precisely measured here. When focusing on the non-manufacturing sectors in Table 11, most
effects become larger and more precisely estimated. They also reveal statistically significant
negative effects of about one percentage point per additional month of PBD on FTE employment
after the second year. The first-stage F-statistics are well above 150 in all versions of the IV
models and indicate the very good predictive power of the instrument (Section 3.2).
16
Our results are reconfirmed when using both IVs, that is, IV 06 for the 2006 reform, which
decreased the PBD by at least six months, and IV 08 for the 2008 reform, which increased the
PBD by three months. The results of changes in PBD on our outcomes of interest (Tables A.1
and A.2) remain very similar to those based on just the single instrument IV 06. The same is true
when we focus on the non-manufacturing sectors (compare Table A.2 with Table 11). However,
the quality of the first-stage model in terms of the F-statistic decreases through the inclusion of
the additional instrument. Therefore, we present estimates with only one instrument (IV 06) as
main results. In summary, our IV results generally confirm the initial OLS results but are less
precisely measured.
Finally, we repeat the IV estimation instrumenting actual unemployment duration (AUD) to
establish a clear causal channel from PBD via actual unemployment duration to firm outcomes.
The findings are shown in Tables 12 and A.3 when using only IV06 as well when using IV06 and
IV08 combined. Corresponding results for non-manufacturing sectors are provided in Tables 13
and A.4. While, as expected, the predictive quality of the first-stage models is lower than when
instrumenting PBD, the results are fully in line with the previously described results for PBD
and suggest that longer PBD affects startup motivation and outcomes via incentivizing longer
actual unemployment duration.
4.2 Robustness Checks: Two Further Estimation Strategies
4.2.1 Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD)
The RDD exploits age-dependent discontinuities in the PBD through the equation:
yi = α1(agei ≥ c)+ f (agei,β )+ f (agei,γ)×1(agei ≥ c)+X ′i δ + εi, (5)
where yi is the outcome variable of interest, i.e. actual unemployment duration and subsequent
performance as an entrepreneur. In addition, Xi is the same set of individual-specific covariates
as before (see Section 3.2), and εi is an error term. The dummy variable, 1(agei ≥ c), reveals
whether individuals benefit from extended PBD because they become unemployed at an age above
the age cutoff associated with the higher maximum PBD. Individual age is the forcing variable,
for which we control with the β coefficient reflecting its direct effect on yi. Moreover, the γ
term reflects its indirect effect on yi via the interaction with the sharp age cutoffs. Consequently,
α measures the pure discontinuity effect, i.e. the RDD estimate of interest, namely how PBD
affects the outcomes of those who start a firm out of unemployment.
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In the RDD, we focus on the period from 2008 onward, an age range from 45 to 54 years
old, and an age cutoff at 50. Below the age of 50, the maximum PBD is 12 months. Above
50, the maximum PBD is 15 months. Hence, a cutoff at 50 allows us to exploit an exogenous
increase in the PBD of three months. Therefore, the identification assumption requires that there
is no precise manipulation of the running variable around the cutoff, e.g. that workers do not
plan to become strategically unemployed just after an age threshold is reached to exploit higher
PBD (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). A comparable RDD approach has already been exploited to
study re-employment outcomes (of dependent workers) for earlier reforms of the maximum PBD
in Germany, see Schmieder et al. (2012, 2016). These authors show that the RDD approach
delivers credible results for their time period studied (1987-2004). We apply a similar RDD for a
more recent period (2003-2011) and with respect to a sample of individuals who transfer from
unemployment to self-employment (i.e. not regular employment and who are therefore excluded
in existing studies.).13
By restricting the regression sample to individuals who became unemployed after January
2008, we ensure that they all faced the same maximum PBD schedule, as shown in columns (6)
and (7) in Table 6 or 7. As no other major labor market reforms occurred and startup subsidy
schemes remained unchanged in the time period under study (cf. Appendix C.2), the only relevant
variation in PBD is driven by the age cutoffs. We test this assumption by conducting a McCrary
density test, which investigates whether there is bunching in the entry into self-employment
from unemployment by workers becoming unemployed around the age cutoff (Imbens and
Lemieux, 2008; McCrary, 2008). Results of the McCrary density test do not indicate significant
discontinuity in the distribution of individuals entering unemployment around the cutoff age
(Figure A.2). Hence, the McCrary test results suggest that the identification assumptions in our
RDD model are satisfied.
4.2.2 Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) Results
Results of the RDD are summarized in Figure A.3, Figure A.4, and Table A.5. Based on the
age-dependent rules on the maximum PBD, as explained in Table 6 and Table 7, in the years
since 2008, one would expect there to be an increase of around three months of PBD at the
age of 50 for individuals who have contributed at least 30 months to social security. Indeed,
13Furthermore, Le Barbanchon (2016) shows that a similar RDD approach performs well in the context of
analyzing a French reform that increased PBD for certain unemployed individuals. Nekoei and Weber (2017)
conduct a similar RDD when estimating the effect of UI generosity on unemployment duration and re-employment
wages in Austria.
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analyses of our sample show that the PBD increases, even though only by around 2.1 instead
of 3 months (first panel in Figure A.3). Furthermore, as the second panel of Figure A.3 shows,
according to our RDD strategy, the increase of 2.1 months in PBD translates into a significant
increase in actual unemployment duration of about 1.2 months, suggesting a duration elasticity
for unemployed individuals who eventually start a business of around 0.6, which is the same
estimate that we obtained via the IV strategy. Unfortunately, the number of observations that can
be used for the RDD is limited. Since information on sales is missing for a significant number of
observations and sales are often highly volatile in the first years after a firm’s foundation, we are
only able to derive meaningful RDD results for employment outcomes after one year and after
two years (Figure A.4). The RDD results suggest that an increase of about 2.1 months decreases
FTE employment by about 12 percent in the first year and about 25 percent in the second year.
Hence, an increase of one month in PBD leads to a reduction in FTE employment of about six
percent in the first year and 12.5 percent in the second year after starting up.
In summary, the RDD results are consistent with those of the IV approach. Longer PBD leads
to an increase in actual unemployment duration, which then leads to a decrease in subsequent
startup success, as measured in terms of FTE employment.
4.2.3 Difference-in-Differences (DiD) Approach
The DiD approach exploits reform-induced changes in the PBD (similar to Cottier et al.,
2019) with the equation:
yit = α +β ∗Treatedit + γ ∗A f tert +δ ∗ (Treated ∗A f ter)it +Xit + εit , (6)
where α is a constant, Xit is a vector that includes the same set of person-specific controls as
before (see Section 3.2), and εit is an error term for each individual i in month t. Moreover, δ
indicates the (causal) reform effect of PBD on our outcomes of interest y. Depending on the
model version, y is either the actual benefit duration, the motivation for starting up, or consists of
subsequent outcomes for the self-employed. In the DiD setting, we exploit the 2006 reform. Thus,
A f tert = 1 is a dummy indicating whether an individual becomes unemployed after February
2006. The treatment group consists of workers entering an UI spell at age 45 or above, whereas
the control group consists of workers younger than 45 who claim UI benefits. The reform effect
measures the treatment of reducing PBD by at least three months.
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4.2.4 Difference-in-Differences (DiD) Results
Our results for the DiD strategy are summarized in Table A.6. The first column in Table A.6
shows that the reduction of (depending on the contribution period prior to claiming benefits and
on age) 3-14 months of PBD significantly reduces actual unemployment durations by, on average,
around 3.6 months. This finding reconfirms the existence of a positive causal relationship
between potential benefit and actual unemployment duration in our sample of founders starting
up out of unemployment. The results for the remaining outcomes are not statistically significant
in the DiD setting when we consider all sectors (columns 5/6 in Table A.6). Focusing on the
non-manufacturing sectors, Table A.7 generally reconfirms our previous findings. As before, the
effects now appear to be measured more precisely, and results indicate a significant increase in
firm performance with respect to sales in the second year after starting up (due to the reduction in
PBD). In summary, the DiD results appear to be consistent with our main findings that reducing
PBD leads to a reduction in actual unemployment duration and to higher growth in terms of sales
after two years of business activity. Note that the precision of the DiD estimates is comparably
low, supposedly because we ignore information concerning how individuals are affected by the
reform, which depends on their exact ages when becoming unemployed. Thus, the lower power
is to be expected compared to that for our IV setting.
4.3 Discussion of Results and Mechanisms
Our empirical results based on three different estimation methods, i.e. IV, RDD, DiD, suggest
a number of conclusions. First, longer PBD increases actual UI duration for those unemployed
individuals who end unemployment by starting a firm. Hence, our results document that what
prior literature has established for individuals transitioning from unemployment to dependent
employment (e.g. Schmieder and von Wachter, 2016) also holds for individuals transitioning
from unemployment to self-employment. In terms of size, our estimated duration elasticity
is around 0.614 and thus a bit higher than what recent estimates focusing on transitions from
unemployment to paid employment suggest. Focusing on transitions from unemployment to paid
employment, Le Barbanchon et al. (2019) report a duration elasticity of 0.3 for France, Nekoei
and Weber (2017) report a duration elasticity of 0.016 for Austria, and Schmieder et al. (2016)
find a duration elasticity of 0.15 for Germany (in the period prior to 2004). Although these
14For the OLS regression, we find a duration elasticity of about 0.5; for the IV and the RDD strategies, we obtain
a duration elasticity of around 0.6; for the DiD strategy, we achieve a duration elasticity of around 0.7. We consider
these estimates to be very similar to each other given that differences in results across the different estimation
strategies are to be expected. The RDD measures a local average treatment effect, whereas the DiD derives the
average treatment effect. Our IV strategy can be intuitively understood as a compromise that unites RDD and DiD
elements. Thus, we expect our IV results to be in between RDD and DiD.
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studies analyze increases in PBD, in a setting like ours, where UI generosity decreases, Doris
et al. (2018) find larger effects. Furthermore, Doris et al. (2018) provide an overview of over 18
studies that estimate the UI duration elasticity with respect to transitions to paid employment
and report a median duration elasticity of 0.53 (cf. Appendix, Table 2 in Doris et al., 2018).
Hence, our estimate of a duration elasticity of 0.6 for those transitioning from unemployment
to self-employment seems to be in reasonable range and somewhat higher than what has been
found for those transitioning to paid employment.15
Second, longer PBD (via longer actual unemployment duration) increases the fraction of
pushed entrepreneurs. More unemployed individuals seem to literally escape unemployment by
becoming self-employed out of self-reported necessity rather than opportunity-driven motivation.
Finally, we find overall consistent, but not always precisely measured, evidence that longer PBD
and longer actual unemployment duration reduce the subsequent success of firms that are started
out of unemployment (in terms of sales and employment growth).
The estimated effects of longer PBD on startup motivation and success can be driven by
different mechanisms. On the one hand, longer PBD can be expected to change the behavior
of unemployed individuals, thereby leading to a different composition of founders who decide
to start a firm out of unemployment (composition effect). On the other hand, by incentivizing
longer actual unemployment duration, longer PBD could alter the success potential at the
individual level (individual-level duration effect). Individual-level duration effects can arise, for
instance, because of stigmatization, a loss of professional networks, or depreciation of skills
and knowledge during an unemployment spell. In addition to these direct negative effects on
startup performance, individual-level duration effects can also financially constrain the growth
potential of firms started out of unemployment by rationing access to credit (in line with the
recent findings of, e.g. Caliendo et al., 2019).
We attempt to assess the potential influence of both mechanisms by analyzing changes in the
composition of our sample of previously unemployed founders over time and compare them to
changes in the composition of a reference group of previously not unemployed founders. We
focus on comparing the two groups across two points in time, namely, before and after the UI
reform of 2006 (our main source of exogenous variation in PBD). In Table 14, we provide t-tests
for the before/after reform comparisons of our main explanatory variables and an additional
15Our findings might additionally suggest that the translation from potential into actual unemployment duration
may be stronger with respect to reductions than increases in the PBD.
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broader indicator of founder quality: the average daily employment wage within five years before
starting up (capped at the social security contribution ceiling). We add this measure to assess the
potential influence of unobserved factors that we do not control for in our models.
Looking at all unemployed founders in our regression sample who are in the age-based
treatment group (two left panels), we observe almost no significant changes in composition
before or after the reform. Consistent with the reform and our estimation results, the average
actual unemployment duration of treated founders increases significantly. Moreover, significantly
more founders receive subsidies from the Federal Employment Agency in the period after the
reform (we control for these subsidies in our regressions). Most notably, the (statistically)
insignificant but sizable increase in the average pre-unemployment wage for founders after the
reform is in line with a composition mechanism of “better” founders due to lower PBD. In
addition, the fact that we also find smaller effect sizes for the reference group of founders who
were not previously unemployed (right panels in Table 14) points towards the possibility that
composition effects are induced by the reform. Overall, given the modest observable differences
in composition, composition effects seem to partially explain our results but are unlikely to be
their main driver.
This assessment is supported by two further checks. First, we re-estimate our main OLS and
IV models without any control variables (see Tables A.8 and A.9 as well as Tables A.10 and A.11),
which allows us to assess whether including covariates, which should substantially reduce the
impact of the composition effects, affect our point estimates for changes in PBD. When estimated
without control variables, all point estimates for changes in PBD or actual unemployment duration
remain very similar. Hence, the test does not suggest strong reform-induced composition changes
in the group of unemployed founders are driving our results. This interpretation is also in
line with the reduction in, but not loss of, statistical significance when moving from OLS to
IV estimation. Second, our assessment is supported by the sample/reference group summary
statistics in Table 1. Differences in human capital between unemployed founders and the
reference group of previously employed founders seem more sizeable than the small differences
between all unemployed founders and unemployed founders with unemployment durations above
the median. Hence, it is unlikely that composition changes over the unemployment duration
explain our regression results.16
16This conclusion also corresponds to earlier findings of Farber et al. (2015), who show that UI extensions in the
US in response to the Great Recession did not have sizeable effects on recipients’ job-finding rates and labor force
participation, hence suggesting that the extensive margin of the UI extensions, which might lead to composition
changes, is rather negligible.
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In summary, our data indicate the existence of both composition and individual-level duration
effects that are induced by the UI policy reforms. Of the two, our results suggest that reform-
induced individual-level duration effects could be the main mechanism behind the estimated
effects of longer PBD on startup success. However, future research should investigate the
mechanisms in more detail and quantify the relative importance of composition versus individual-
level duration effects.
5 Stylized Theoretical Model
In the following section, we present a stylized model to rationalize the empirical findings that we
observed in the previous Section 4. We conclude this section by discussing the policy options in
the model (Section 5.2), implications in terms of fiscal externalities (Section 5.3), and general
policy implications of our findings (Section 5.4).
5.1 The Framework
We consider workers who become unemployed in period t = 0, provided they remain unemployed
and receive UI benefits for duration d.17 In each time period (month), they receive unemployment
benefits bt until the maximal potential unemployment benefit duration PBD is reached (cf.
Section 3.1). Focusing on the case of a two-layer UI system, benefits can be defined as bt = b̄
for t ≤ PBD, where b̄ is the constant UI benefit level which the unemployed individual receives
for the entire UI spell (until exhausting benefits at the PBD). The UI benefits received depend on
the previous wage, i.e. they constitute the replacement rate fraction of the average monthly wage
income over the six months before becoming unemployed. Next, bt = b̃ < b̄ for t > PBD, where
b̃ can be interpreted as Germany’s existential minimum assistance “Arbeitslosengeld II”, which
is independent of previous contribution months and lower than the wage-dependent UI benefits
(b̄). Without loss of generality, this amount is the same for all eligible claimants.18 We assume
that each individual has a latent ability (including entrepreneurial ability) θ ∼ G(θ), where G()
is a normal density function. Then in each time period, an unemployed individual has to decide
17The model is in continuous time, and the horizon for each worker lasts until retirement time T . Moreover, we
consider them to be risk-neutral.
18Note that the replacement rate for UI benefits (b̄) is 60% for single individuals and 67% for individuals with
dependent children. When receiving the existential minimum (b̃), the additional amount received per child on top
of the basic minimum corresponds approximately to the general child allowances every parent receives from the
German federal state (“Kindergeld”). Thus, the relative drop in income when exhausting UI benefits does not vary
much per person independent of the family structure, and we abstract from this issue for the purpose of this chapter.
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whether to search for employment or to start a firm, i.e. to become self-employed. Let V eu be
the value function of an unemployed individual searching for employment and V seu be the value
function of an unemployed individual starting a business. Then the decision of an unemployed
individual is characterized by the value function:
V ut = max{V eu,t ,V seu,t} (7)
Value of Searching for Employment out of Unemployment Ignoring savings (workers live
hand-to-mouth), the value of searching for employment when an individual is unemployed can
be characterized by:







V et+1(wt+1)dF(wt+1)+ [ptF(φt)+(1− pt)]V ut+1
}
(8)
An unemployed individual receives consumption flow utility from benefits cu,t = bt19 but
faces search costs ψt , which, in line with the literature (e.g. Schmieder and von Wachter, 2016),
are assumed to be a differentiable, increasing, and convex function of search effort st . With
probability pt = p(st ,θ), which depends on search efforts and ability, the unemployed worker
receives a job offer for period t +1. Note that in this setting, the individual’s optimal behavior is
characterized by a reservation wage φt , above which any wage offer wt ≥ φt is accepted.20
Thus, with probability 1− F(φt), the offer is accepted and the individual becomes re-
employed, receiving the corresponding expected value of being employed, i.e. V et+1 (see Equa-
tion (9)). However, with probability F(φt), the offer is too low and is rejected. In this case and if
the worker receives no other offer (with probability 1− pt), s/he remains unemployed in the next
month and receives the next period value of being in unemployment, i.e. V ut+1 (Equation (7)).
As usual, β is the discount factor for future period returns.21 The two-layer UI system implies
through the parameter bt that if an individual stays unemployed, surpassing the PBD, the outside
option will decline to the existential minimum (from bt = b̄ to bt = b̃ < b̄). Thus, a drop in the
value function (V eu,t) is to be expected in the month when the maximum PBD is reached.
19Note that cu,t = bt + yu, where yu could be income from other sources that, if assumed to remain constant over
the UI spell and exogenously given, would not alter our qualitative conclusions (e.g. support from family members).
20Note that the cumulative distribution function F() may depend on the duration of unemployment, for instance,
due to depreciation in human capital, (statistical) discrimination, or stigma effects, as explained in Jarosch and
Pilossoph (2019) and suggested by the experimental evidence in Oberholzer-Gee (2008).
21One could introduce myopic behavior on the part of agents by changing the discount factor. We abstract from
this complication, as we have no empirical evidence that irrational behavior is driving our results.
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The Value of Being in Employment is then characterized by:
V et = (wt− τ)+β{λtV ut+1 +(1−λt)V et+1} (9)
An employed worker receives consumption flow utility ce,t = wt− τ , i.e. consumption based
on the net wage.22 Variable λt is an exogenous separation rate that may vary depending on
macroeconomic conditions over time. Thus, with probability λt , the worker may lose his/her job
and become unemployed again, but, with probability 1−λt , the worker remains employed. As a
simplifying restriction, we ignore the option of moving from employment to self-employment
but focus on flows from unemployment to self-employment, as this resembles our available
empirical setting and is the relevant labor market flow we study.
Value of Entering Self-Employment out of Unemployment The value for an unemployed
individual becoming self-employed out of unemployment is characterized by:







V set+1(πt+1)dF(πt+1)+ [ptF(φt)+(1− pt)]V ut+1
}
(10)
An unemployed individual evaluating whether to become self-employed faces a value func-
tion similar to that of an individual searching for employment Equation (8). Again, the individual
has a consumption flow utility in the form of unemployment benefits bt and faces search costs
ψset (stθ). We expect these search costs to be different from, and more dependent on individual
ability than, those costs incurred when searching for employment since an individual has to
develop an idea, do market research, and find capital instead of writing applications during
the more standardized process of looking for paid employment. In other words, becoming
self-employed depends more on an individual’s skills θ . The higher the ability, the smaller are
market-entry search costs. The unemployed individual still faces a reservation wage φt , above
which potential profits from self-employment would be accepted. However, if the potential
profit is too low, the individual may remain unemployed and continue to look for employment.
Otherwise, if self-employment profits are higher than the reservation wage πt ≥ φt , the individual
will prefer to form a startup.
22Taxes could be also designed to be proportional taxes (1− t) without changing the qualitative results.
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Value of Being in Self-Employment The value of being in self-employment can be characterized
by the following value function:
V seut = πt(θ)+ subt +β{γ(θ)V ut+1 +(1− γ(θ))V set+1} (11)
A self-employed person earns profits πt(θ) (net of the startup costs and taxes in the case
of positive profits) and may receive a subsidy subt . Therefore, the returns πt(θ) are assumed
to increase with entrepreneurial skills (∂πt()
∂θ
> 0), reflecting, e.g. that the quality of successful
business ideas may increase with θ . Similarly, the probability that the startup fails, γ(θ), is
assumed to decrease as ability increases, ∂γ()
∂θ
< 0, reflecting, e.g. that better business ideas are
less likely to result in failure. Thus, with probability (1− γ(θ)), the startup will survive. With
probability γ(θ), the founder has to return to unemployment, V ut+1 Equation (7).
The Effect of Unemployment Duration on Value Functions The unemployed worker’s de-
cision problem Equation (7) involves maximizing the expected utility between the value of
moving from unemployment to employment and the value of becoming self-employed out of
unemployment. See Appendix D.1 for the derivation of the results.
First, the value function for moving from unemployment to employment can be charac-
terized by Equation (8), where V et+1 is characterized by Equation (9). It is important to note




∂d |θ < 0. There are two main sources of UI duration dependence: the
search effort may vary over the unemployment duration, and, over time, benefit levels decrease
(reaching PBD at least once with the drop to the existential minimum).23 The accepted job offer’s
value depends on both the search effort, which determines the job offer arrival rate p(st ,θ), and
the re-employment wage.
We derive the optimal search intensity and reservation wage paths in order to observe how
these variables react to an increase in d = PBD. We find that the reservation wage is positively
correlated with the potential unemployment benefit duration, i.e. ∂φt
∂d > 0. The search intensity
reacts negatively to an increase in PBD, i.e. ∂ st
∂d < 0. Hence, an individual will prefer to stay
unemployed longer when the PBD is increased. This effect of PBD on actual unemployment
23Nekoei and Weber (2017) show that a directed search model incorporates these two sources of duration
dependence and includes the random search McCall-style model that we present as a special case. Moreover, they
reveal that selectivity may be positively, and duration dependence negatively, affecting re-employment wages.
Burdett et al. (2020) build a structural model that reproduces negative wage effects following a job loss and suggest
that foregone human capital accumulation is the main source of their persistent drain on post-unemployment
earnings.
26
duration, which can be rationalized by negative duration dependence
(
∂V eut
∂d |θ < 0
)
, has been
shown to be an empirically robust finding, even if there is not yet a consensus concerning the
welfare implications for post-unemployment wages (e.g. Schmieder et al., 2016; Schmieder and
von Wachter, 2016; Nekoei and Weber, 2017).24
Second, the value function of moving from unemployment to self-employment can be
characterized by Equation (10), where V set+1 is characterized by Equation (11). Holding (en-










∂d |θ < 0. We
derive this fact by exploiting the definitions of V eu,t and V
se
u,t . By assuming that the value of leaving
unemployment in the next period depends, on average, on the present value of the reservation
wage, we can write V eu,t+1 =
1
ρ
φt . In the case of self-employment, the latter definition has to
be extended to V set+1 =
1−γ(θ)
ρ
φt because self-employment can only be realized with probability
[1− γ(θ)].
Having derived the optimal reservation wage and search intensity paths, we document that the
optimal search intensity for business opportunities is less dependent on unemployment duration d
than in the case of searching for regular employment. Thus, the negative unemployment duration
dependence for becoming self-employed is smaller than that for searching for employment,
reflecting the idea that self-employment can be interpreted as an alternative professional activity
that is more dependent on an individual’s skills than on the labor market conditions and thus less
dependent on unemployment duration (compare Appendix D.1). Moreover, the search process
for self-employment is different from the search for regular employment. Now, it is possible to
rationalize our empirical results by analyzing qualitatively how the value functions for becoming
employed V eut (Equation (8)) and self-employed V
se
ut (Equation (10)) evolve with unemployment
duration d and how these evolutions influence an unemployed individual’s decision, given his/her
(entrepreneurial) ability. Figure 6 illustrates that the unemployed individual will prefer to find
a job when the value function for searching for employment V eut is above the value function
for becoming self-employed V seut . Whereas, the individual will prefer to start a business when
V seut >V
e
ut |θ . The red line depicts
∂V eut




∂d |θ < 0. Moreover,
24Note that there have been different theories proposed to explain this finding. These theories include human
capital or job-specific skills decaying over unemployment spells and statistical discrimination, which assumes
that individuals who are less capable remain unemployed for longer periods. Additionally, stock-flow matching
could also explain duration dependence, as it implies that those entering unemployment and not finding a job
match quickly become increasingly dependent on the inflow of newly posted vacancies (note that flow variables are
quantitatively smaller than stock variables).
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the vertical black line marks the PBD; at this point in the unemployment duration, the red line
drops by x = b̄− b̃ because UI benefits b̄ drop to the existential minimum b̃ (cf. Appendix C).
Thus, the stylized model suggests that PBD can determine the composition of the group of
self-employed individuals who transition from unemployment, which becomes apparent when
analyzing how unemployed individuals behave in this model.
First of all, by holding all else fixed as (entrepreneurial) ability changes, we can observe the
following. As Figure 7 illustrates, some high-ability individuals may always decide to become
self-employed once unemployed, i.e. once they must search for a new post-unemployment
labor market status. Correspondingly, Figure 8 shows that certain low-skilled unemployed
individuals would never decide to become self-employed but rather would continue to search for
employment. Note that these individuals have been employees and, after becoming unemployed,
start to consider self-employment as an alternative to re-employment. Thus, they may only start
to think about their entrepreneurial abilities once they become unemployed.
As Figure 9 illustrates, our model explains how the government can influence the composition
of the group of unemployed individuals who decide to become self-employed out of unemploy-
ment via setting the PBD. Note that a minimum PBD is needed for even highly entrepreneurial
types to have enough time to prepare the transition from unemployment to self-employment.
Beyond that, however, the longer an individual is unemployed before moving to self-employment,
the lower his/her V seut and thus the lower his/her subsequent firm’s performance appears to be (i.e.
the composition changes). Moreover, if we considered negative individual-level duration effects
to be the main response to a longer actual unemployment duration (that was induced through
longer PBD), we would reach similar qualitative conclusions. In other words, composition
and individual-level duration effects or a mixture of both, would be in line with the empirical
evidence that PBD positively affects actual benefit duration and, through the latter, negatively
affects the motivation to become self-employed as well as subsequent startup success.
Finally, as Figure 10 shows, our model can also rationalize our results for the case in which
unemployment duration would not also harm potential self-employment outcomes, i.e. in the case
of zero UI duration dependence for self-employment outcomes. Then, the empirical result of the
subsequent startup success declining as the unemployment duration of a founder increases can
also be rationalized with a horizontal value function V seu that is independent of d. To summarize,
Figure 11 demonstrates that the government can change startup success by setting the PBD.
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5.2 Further Policy Options in the Model
Early Re-training for Employment Figure 12 shows that, given the same maximal PBD, early
re-training can reduce the rate at which V eu declines with actual unemployment duration. Thus,
for a fixed PBD, retraining may improve welfare, thus maintaining consumption smoothing
and general matching considerations for unemployment to employment transitions. This could
reduce the number of necessity founders via slowing the negative UI duration dependence in V eu
that is itself causally influenced by PBD.
Subsidies for Self-Employment As Figure 13 illustrates, subsidies targeted at unemployed
workers who may have revealed some entrepreneurial skills, e.g. via a business plan, would
increase V su and thus the post-unemployment startup success probability. Hence, subsidies could
make it easier for unemployed individuals with promising ideas to stop searching for employment
and focus on preparing their startup, consequently reducing their time period in unemployment
(and hence, the fiscal externality; see next paragraph).25
5.3 Implications for Fiscal Externality
When thinking about optimal UI benefit duration, the social costs of changing the PBD must be
taken into account, which is the so-called fiscal externality it creates (Lawson, 2017). That is, in
the spirit of the Baily-Chetty framework (e.g. Chetty, 2009; Kroft and Notowidigdo, 2016), the
optimal UI benefit duration should balance the welfare benefits created by additional insurance,
which help to smooth overall consumption, with the social costs of extending PBD. The latter is
captured by the fiscal externality (i.e. the effect on the government’s budget).
To illustrate the role of taking self-employment out of unemployment into account, let us
consider an example. In a worker’s last pre-unemployment job, s/he earned wage w and paid
taxes τ .26 The worker enters unemployment in time period T0. In line with our results, extending
the PBD would induce longer actual unemployment of (T −T0) periods. In time period T , the
unemployed individual becomes self-employed. Especially, if the individual becomes a necessity
entrepreneur who actually does not want to become self-employed but only starts a firm to
escape unemployment, their profits πs might be lower than their pre-unemployment wage w (as
25Early training for self-employment (relaxing the assumption of entrepreneurial types such that some skills can
be developed through external support) could increase V su . Thus, the post-unemployment startup success probability
could be increased, e.g. by coaching founders in setting up better business plans.
26Without loss of generality, we just consider proportional taxes and follow Lawson (2017) in assuming that the
fiscal externality of social security programs works through labor income taxes.
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a proxy for the hypothetical re-employment wage) during their self-employment spell (lasting
from period T +1 until time period S). If, in addition, the (necessity) entrepreneur fails at time S
and drops back into unemployment from time S+1 onward, there would be forgone tax revenues
(τπs) and the benefits paid during unemployment (b) to consider. Formalizing the example, we
arrive at a formula for fiscal externality:







The first term is the standard duration effect, which imposes a negative fiscal externality
in the case of limited UI duration. In fact, longer unemployment duration implies that the
government forgoes potential tax revenue (τw) and also has to pay for the unemployment
insurance expenditures b over the course of the worker’s unemployment spell. By increasing
PBD, the negative fiscal externality would increase, not only for those who then become employed
(Schmieder et al., 2016) but also for those who start a business out of unemployment, as shown
earlier, because, in both cases, the PBD is positively linked to actual unemployment duration.
The second term takes into account the effect of unemployment insurance on self-employment
performance in terms of the government’s budget. In the given example, when the profits from
self-employed are below pre-unemployment wages (πs < w) [as a proxy for the hypothetical
re-employment wage], the negative fiscal externality would increase.27 However, in theory, this
term could also decrease the overall negative fiscal externality if πs > w, which might most likely
be the case for opportunity entrepreneurs who have good business plans and might be better off
than they were with pre-unemployment wages or would be under other re-employment options.28
The last term expresses the extra cost incurred if the self-employed fails and the individual
subsequently (for a period Ds) returns to unemployment. In that case, a second-order duration
effect consisting of forgone tax revenue and potential benefit payments could further increase the
fiscal externality.
In summary, taking the effect of longer PBD on self-employment performance into account
may change the overall fiscal externality of UI, which, in turn, could alter optimal UI considera-
tions. For instance, if PBD pushed many unemployed individuals into necessity entrepreneurship
and doing so caused the negative fiscal externality to grow, as in the given example, a decrease in
27Note that this case is plausible even at low income levels. Regular wages are usually bound by minimum
wages, whereas the corresponding earnings from self-employment have no lower bound.
28In fact, if these positive effects were to dominate, this situation would correspond to the positive UI wage
effect, as suggested by Nekoei and Weber (2017), for those who start a business instead of finding re-employment.
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optimal PBD may be implied. Given that the literature on optimal UI usually considers just the
transition from unemployment into paid employment, ignoring transitions into self-employment,
if such transitions are considered at all, implies that only the first standard duration term in
Equation (12) is taken into account. Thus, it is important to consider the impact of PBD on
self-employment and the associated fiscal externality when it comes to the optimal UI design.
5.4 Policy Implications
First, our results have implications for the design of an optimal UI policy. The previous
Section 5.3 shows that longer PBD may increase the fiscal externality through its effect on
self-employment performance. By omitting the possibility that unemployed individuals can also
choose to enter self-employment instead of dependent employment, the literature and politics
have neglected this effect. Too much selection into self-employment due to necessity after a
long unemployment duration may, however, imply high social costs. Thus, the UI system should
design optimal PBD in such a way that considers both transitions to dependent employment and to
self-employment, as well as their outcomes. Moreover, our findings can improve insights into the
so-called value of non-employment, which is important for the results of many wage-bargaining
models (Jäger et al., 2019).
Second, since economic trends induced by digitization and the popularity of policy tools that
promote startup activity to pave the way out of economic crises may lead to more startups in the
future, thinking about the design of social safety nets, particularly with respect to unemployment
insurance for self-employed individuals, may become increasingly relevant. Moreover, the results
for Germany, with a low overall unemployment rate, might be rather lower bound estimates.
Thus, this paper shifts its attention to an important discussion of how one should best design
social safety nets for self-employed individuals.
Finally, the findings in our paper may also be relevant in the evaluation of active labor market
policies because such policies can be interpreted as measures that usually involve extending PBD
and providing subsidies that correspond to UI benefits. Often, these active labor market policies
target the long-term unemployed. In the light of our results, questions should be raised as to
what extent current policies for long-term unemployed individuals are desirable. Our results
indicate that interventions should not be measures of last resort but rather target unemployed
individuals early during their unemployment spells. In general, investments in early retraining
and well-targeted startup subsidies for unemployed individuals who have sustainable business
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ideas could increase the share of founders with a high potential for success (much like better
financial development can improve the match between motivation and occupation, as suggested
by Bianchi (2012)). Thus, fiscal externalities could be reduced, and social welfare improved.
6 Conclusion
This paper addresses the question of how potential unemployment insurance (UI) benefit
duration (PBD) affects the actual unemployment duration before unemployed individuals become
self-employed as well as their motivations for becoming self-employed and their outcomes as
entrepreneurs. While existing literature has addressed how UI policies affect the unemployment
duration and re-employment wages of those individuals transitioning to dependent employment,
we are the first to address this issue in the context of transitions to self-employment by creating a
new comprehensive dataset on founders in Germany. Since active labor market policies, which
incentivize mainly long-term unemployed individuals to become self-employed, are commonly
used as policy measures to fight unemployment, understanding the effects of the design of UI
policies on startup success seems to be highly relevant.
Using the instrumental variables methods (RDD and DiD for robustness), we identify the
causal effects of the policy variable, PBD, on entrepreneurial outcomes by exploiting reform-
and age-based exogenous variation in PBD within the German UI system. We find that in a
sample of previously unemployed founders, longer PBD leads to longer actual unemployment
duration and, through the latter, to increases in the propensity of unemployed individuals to
feel pushed into self-employment (out of necessity) as opposed to starting a firm due to a
business opportunity. Moreover, a longer unemployment duration is associated with a poorer
entrepreneurial performance in terms of both employment growth and sales.
This negative overall causal relationship can be rationalized by a mix of both an effect on
the composition of startups out of unemployment and an individual-level duration effect on the
founders over the UI spell. In a stylized formal model, we demonstrate how both mechanisms
explain why a government’s policy change in PBD can generate our observed findings. Exploring
the contributions of both mechanisms empirically, extensions of our analyses show little changes
in the composition of the group of unemployed founders over different UI policy regimes. Our
analyses therefore suggest that our results are driven by UI duration policy’s effect on the
individual-level entrepreneurial potential.
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A consistent explanation for this finding is that individuals’ financial, social, and human capital
depreciates in unemployment. An exact empirical derivation of the quantitative importance
of the different mechanisms behind our findings, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.
As in the literature focusing on the effect of UI on transitions to dependent employment (e.g.
Schmieder and von Wachter, 2016), additional data and methods are needed to better assess the
contributions of different mechanisms to the overall policy effect.
Given the current lack of evidence regarding the role of PBD on startup success and on
self-employment in general, our results are of strong relevance from a public policy perspective.
They show that it is important to consider self-employment as a post-unemployment outcome in
typical optimal UI models, which are usually based on the sufficient statistics approach following
the Baily-Chetty model (Chetty, 2009; Landais et al., 2018). Ignoring entrepreneurship out of
unemployment likely leads to underestimating fiscal externalities. For instance, a UI policy
could trigger firm creation by low-performing necessity entrepreneurs whose tax revenues will
be comparably low or who may produce extra costs for society by returning to unemployment.
Rather than pushing the long-term unemployed into self-employment, UI policies might therefore
be better targeted at early re-training for those who might otherwise become self-employed out
of necessity later. Our results are particularly relevant for all countries with generous UI benefit
durations and countries granting extended UI benefits to founders starting a business out of
unemployment. Due to its relatively low unemployment and self-employment rate levels, our
results for Germany may be considered lower bound estimates for other countries.29
29E.g. Camarero Garcia and Hansch (2020) investigate the role of UI benefit levels on self-employment in Spain.
They complement the present study by showing that the effects of PBD and UI benefits together constitute the total
effect of UI on the transition channel from unemployment to self-employment.
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List of Abbreviations
AUD actual unemployment duration.
DiD Difference-in-Differences.
FTE full-time equivalent.
IAB Institute for Employment Research of the German Federal Employment Agency.
IV Instrumental Variable.
PBD potential benefit duration.
RDD Regression Discontinuity Design.
SE self-employed.
UI unemployment insurance.
ZEW Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
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7 Figures & Tables
Figure 1: Firm Outcomes in Years after Foundation for All Founders
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Notes: The Figure shows firm outcomes of non-team founders aged 35-65 (analogous to the definition of our
main estimation sample) in years after foundation. We see the outcomes of startups in terms of sales per year and
full-time equivalent employment based on 5,250 (sales) and 5,850 (employment) startups established between
2005 and 2011 from our linked dataset (see Section 2). Firms usually stay in the panel for seven years but can
drop out if they fail or refuse to take part in more than two consecutive years. Thus, less firms are observed in
year seven compared to year one after starting up.
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Figure 2: Firm Outcomes in Years after Foundation by Previous Employment Status
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not unemployed unemployed
Notes: The Figure shows firm outcomes of non-team founders aged 35-65 (see the definition of our
main estimation sample in Table 1) in years after foundation split by the previous labor market status
of the founder (not unemployed or unemployed). We cover startups established between 2005 and
2011 from our linked dataset as described in Section 2.
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Figure 3: Firm Outcomes in Years after Foundation split by Median Unemployment Duration
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Notes: The Figure shows firm outcomes of non-team founders aged 35-65 (see the definition of our
main estimation sample in Table 1) with previous unemployment spell in years after foundation split at
the medium (actual) unemployment duration. We cover startups established between 2005 and 2011
from our linked dataset as described in Section 2.
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Figure 4: Firm Outcomes in Years after Foundation split by Motivation for Starting Up
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Notes: The Figure shows firm outcomes of non-team founders aged 35-65 (analogous to the definition of
our main estimation sample) in years after foundation split by self-reported motivation, i.e. opportunity
vs. pushed/necessity driven entrepreneurship. We cover approximately 5,050 (sales) and 5,600
(employment) startups established between 2005 and 2011 from our linked dataset as described in
Section 2. The notion of using, instead of necessity-driven founder, the term pushed entrepreneur is
best understood by checking the spikes of the exit rate from unemployment into self-employment split
by the motivation to start up which is shown in Figure A.1.
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Figure 5: Firm Outcomes in Years after Foundation by Motivation for Starting Up out of Unemployment
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UE opportunity entrepreneur UE pushed entrepreneur
Notes: The Figure shows firm outcomes of non-team founders aged 35-65 (see the definition of our
main estimation sample in Table 1) with previous unemployment spell in years after foundation split
by self-reported motivation, i.e. opportunity vs. pushed/necessity driven entrepreneurship. We cover
startups established between 2005 and 2011 from our linked dataset as described in Section 2.
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Notes: The figure illustrates how the value functions for becoming employed V eut and self-employed V
se
ut evolve
with actual unemployment duration (AUD) d according to the stylized model as explained in Section 5. The
red line depicts ∂V
e
ut
∂d |θ < 0. The blue line depicts
∂V seut




∂d |θ . The
vertical black line marks the potential benefit duration (PBD). At this point of unemployment duration the
red/blue line drop by x = b̄− b̃ because UI benefits b̄ drop to the existential minimum b̃ (compare Equation (8)
and Equation (10)). In this example, the unemployed individual would first prefer to search for employment.
But once the red line crosses the blue one: from this unemployment duration (d) onward, the unemployed
individual would prefer starting a business. Note that these results hold as long as depreciation in entrepreneurial
skills is smaller in absolute terms than depreciation in employment skills and thus as long as the blue line
has a less negative slope than the red line. If the value of becoming self-employed out of unemployment was
independent of unemployment duration d, the blue line would be a horizontal line, and the associated pure
selection channel (composition effect) could also explain our main results, i.e. that longer PBD leads to longer
actual unemployment duration and more pushed startups.
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Notes: The figure illustrates how the value functions for becoming employed V eut and self-employed V
se
ut evolve




∂d |θ < 0. The blue line depicts
∂V seut




∂d |θ . The vertical black
line marks the potential benefit duration: at this point of unemployment duration the red/blue line drops by
x = b̄− b̃, as UI benefits b̄ drop to the existential minimum b̃ (Equation (8) and Equation (10)). The unemployed
individual learns to have such high (entrepreneurial) ability that she starts a business.






Notes: The figure illustrates how the value functions for becoming employed V eut and self-employed V
se
ut evolve




∂d |θ < 0. The blue line depicts
∂V seut




∂d |θ . The vertical black
line marks the potential benefit duration: at this point of unemployment duration the red/blue line drops by
x = b̄− b̃, as UI benefits b̄ drop to the existential minimum b̃ (Equation (8) and Equation (10)). The unemployed
individual learns to have such low (entrepreneurial) ability that she prefers employment.
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Notes: The figure illustrates how the value functions for becoming employed V eut and self-employed V
se
ut evolve
with unemployment duration (AUD) d according to the stylized model in Section 5. The red line depicts
∂V eut
∂d |θ < 0. The cyan/blue line depicts
∂V seut




∂d |θ . The vertical black
line marks the potential benefit duration (PBD): at this point of unemployment duration the red/blue line drops by
x = b̄− b̃, as UI benefits b̄ drop to the existential minimum b̃ (Equation (8) and Equation (10)). In this example,
the unemployed individual with high ability θH would decide to become self-employed after a short UI duration
(cyan line), whereas the other unemployed individual θL would intensify search for employment before reaching
PBD (red line to the left of PBD), when V eut suddenly drops below V
se
ut (blue line to the right of PBD). Here, the
government could induce type H to become self-employed and L to search for employment.











Notes: The figure illustrates how the value functions for becoming employed V eut and self-employed V
se
ut evolve
with unemployment duration d according to the stylized model as explained in Section 5. The red line depicts
∂V eut
∂d |θ < 0. The blue line depicts
∂V seut
∂d |θ = 0. The vertical black line marks PBD: at this point of unemployment
duration the red/blue line drops by x = b̄− b̃, as UI benefits b̄ drop to the existential minimum b̃ ( Equation (8)
and Equation (10)).
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Notes: The figure illustrates how the value functions for becoming employed V eut and self-employed V
se
ut evolve
with unemployment duration (AUD) d according to the stylized model in Section 5. The red line depicts
∂V eut
∂d |θ < 0. The cyan/blue line depicts
∂V seut




∂d |θ . The vertical black
line marks the potential benefit duration (PBD): at this point of unemployment duration the red/blue line drops by
x = b̄− b̃, as UI benefits b̄ drop to the existential minimum b̃ (Equation (8) and Equation (10)). In this example,
the government increases PBD (PBD moves to the right). PBD1 represents the initial potential benefit duration.
PBD2 the extended one. At the initial PBD1, the unemployed individual with high ability (θH) would decide to
become self-employed after a short UI duration (cyan line), whereas the other unemployed individual (θL) would
rather accept the next job when reaching PBD1 (red curve is above dark blue curve at PBD1). This illustrates, that
in theory, increasing the potential benefit duration to PBD2 can change the composition among the unemployed
individuals start up. Now, the value for becoming self-employed would be higher for both high individuals with
θH (opportunity entrepreneurs) and for individuals with θL (necessity entrepreneurs) compared to the value for
transitioning from unemployment to wage employment (at PBD2 the dark blue curve is now above the red curve).
This illustrates how PBD can change the composition of startups created out of unemployment.
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Notes: The figure illustrates how the value functions for becoming employed V eut and self-employed V
se
ut evolve
with unemployment duration d according to the stylized model in Section 5. The red line depicts ∂V
e
ut
∂d |θ < 0.
The cyan/blue line depicts ∂V
se
ut




∂d |θ . The vertical black line marks the
potential benefit duration (PBD): at this point of d the red/blue line drops by x = b̄− b̃, as UI benefits b̄ drop to
the existential minimum b̃ (Equation (8), Equation (10)). By early retraining, the value function of searching for
employment V eut could be increased, as the green line indicates.






Notes: The figure shows how the value functions for becoming employed V eut and self-employed V
se
ut evolve
with unemployment duration d according to the stylized model in Section 5. The red line depicts ∂V
e
ut
∂d |θ < 0.
The blue line depicts ∂V
se
ut




∂d |θ . The vertical black line marks the
potential benefit duration (PBD): at this point of unemployment duration the red/blue line drops by x = b̄− b̃, as
UI benefits b̄ drop to the existential minimum b̃ (Equation (8) and Equation (10)). By providing startup subsidies
or special training for future self-employed, the government could increase V seut , as shown by the green line.
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7.1 Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics: Regression Sample - for previously Unemployed (above median unemployment duration) or Employed Founders
Regression sample of unemployed founders Founders with > median AUD Previously not unemployed founders
Variable N Mean SD Min Max N Mean SD Min Max N Mean SD Min Max
Actual unemployment duration (AUD) (in months) 1291 4.79 4.56 0.03 36.17 641 8.02 4.52 3.12 36.17 0
Potential benefit duration (PBD) (in months) 1291 12.32 4.25 0.59 37.42 641 13.31 4.62 3.52 37.42 0
Tertiary degree (=1) 1291 0.28 0.45 0 1 641 0.30 0.46 0 1 1610 0.35 0.48 0 1
Founder was self-employed (SE) before (=1) 1291 0.15 0.36 0 1 641 0.16 0.37 0 1 1610 0.23 0.42 0 1
Managerial experience as employee (=1) 1291 0.13 0.33 0 1 641 0.14 0.34 0 1 1610 0.15 0.36 0 1
Female founder (=1) 1291 0.15 0.35 0 1 641 0.15 0.35 0 1 1610 0.13 0.34 0 1
Founder of non-German origin (=1) 1291 0.06 0.23 0 1 641 0.07 0.25 0 1 1610 0.05 0.21 0 1
SE Subsidy by Employment Agency (=1) 1291 0.75 0.43 0 1 641 0.73 0.44 0 1 1610 0.38 0.49 0 1
Industry Experience (in years) 1291 17.22 9.52 1.00 50.00 641 17.00 10.33 1.00 50.00 1610 16.56 9.15 1 54.00
Age of Founder (in years) 1291 44.44 5.93 35.09 65.11 641 45.28 6.20 35.34 65.11 1610 43.93 6.01 35 63.85
Sales in Year 1 1039 173,661 461,647 0 8,123,565 507 134,149 451,385 0 8,123,565 1309 399,872 2,467,627 0 84,370,000
Sales in Year 2 851 231,293 665,161 0 13,640,000 409 212,599 830,844 0 13,640,000 1067 400,055 1,121,272 0 24,180,000
FTE Employment after Year 1 1291 0.61 1.60 0 16.50 641 0.39 1.26 0 13.00 1610 1.02 3.28 0 74.50
FTE Employment after Year 2 1272 0.85 2.08 0 28.25 628 0.54 1.44 0 12.50 1597 1.45 4.26 0 95.75
Pushed/Necessity motive (=1) 1256 0.35 0.48 0 1 631 0.39 0.49 0 1 1531 0.21 0.41 0 1
Technology-intensive services 1291 0.19 0.39 0 1 641 0.20 0.40 0 1 1610 0.23 0.42 0 1
High-technology manufacturing 1291 0.09 0.28 0 1 641 0.08 0.28 0 1 1610 0.12 0.33 0 1
Skill-intensive services 1291 0.05 0.21 0 1 641 0.05 0.22 0 1 1610 0.08 0.27 0 1
Software supply and consultancy 1291 0.03 0.18 0 1 641 0.03 0.18 0 1 1610 0.06 0.23 0 1
Non-high-tech manufacturing 1291 0.12 0.33 0 1 641 0.11 0.31 0 1 1610 0.12 0.33 0 1
Other business-oriented services 1291 0.07 0.25 0 1 641 0.07 0.25 0 1 1610 0.05 0.22 0 1
Cons.-or. services in creative sect. 1291 0.02 0.15 0 1 641 0.02 0.15 0 1 1610 0.03 0.16 0 1
Consumer-oriented services 1291 0.10 0.30 0 1 641 0.10 0.30 0 1 1610 0.07 0.25 0 1
Construction 1291 0.16 0.36 0 1 641 0.15 0.35 0 1 1610 0.11 0.31 0 1
Retail & wholesale 1291 0.18 0.38 0 1 641 0.19 0.39 0 1 1610 0.14 0.35 0 1
Notes: This table shows summary statistics for non-team founders that have started their business out of unemployment (first panel). In the second panel, our table shows the same
statistics for the sub-sample of these non-team founders that had equal or greater than median actual unemployment duration (AUD) before starting up. The table only includes those
individuals that have maximum potential benefit duration (PBD) at the beginning of the unemployment spell, since the empirical strategies require that our main regression sample
consists of non-team founders that have achieved these criteria. Note that out of the around 4,000 non-team founders having unemployment experience before starting up in our data,
approximately 1,300 satisfy the criteria to be included in our main regression sample: they became unemployed between 2003 and 2011, were between 35 and 65 years old when
becoming unemployed, are eligible to maximum potential benefit duration, and have information on all included control variables available. Finally, the right-hand panel of this table
shows the same summary statistics for a reference group of founders who have started their business out of employment, i.e. they have not been previously unemployed.
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Table 2: Definition of Necessity/Pushed vs. Opportunity Founders for Regression Sample
Motive to become entrepreneur Opportunity entrepreneur Pushed entrepreneur
Self-determined working 527 0
Realisation of business idea 255 0
Better earning potential 32 0
Tax incentives 3 0
No suitable employment options 0 169
Escape from unemployment 0 260
Forced by former employer 0 10
Total 817 439
Notes: This table is based on information from the IAB/ZEW Start-Up Panel and shows only our main
regression sample. 1,300 non-team founders with maximal UI potential benefit duration that have
been previously unemployed are considered in this table (see the definition of our main estimation
sample in Table 1). Founders are asked about their motivation for starting a firm during the survey
interview that is conducted when they enter the panel for the first time. Note that the intuition behind
using the term pushed entrepreneur can be well understood by checking the spikes of the exit rate
from unemployment into self-employment split by the motivation to start up, which is shown in
Figure A.1. This is corroborated when looking at Table 1: Previously employed founders are much
less likely to feel pushed into entrepreneurship (21% vs. 35% for previously unemployed founders).
Table 3: Examples of Startups included in the Industry Classification
Industry Classification Examples
Technology-intensive services Computer facility management, web hosting;
architecture and engineering consulting; technical testing/analysis
High-technology manufacturing Manufacturing of glass, optical instruments, photographic equipment,
manufacturing of electric lighting/electrical equipment,
manufacturing of other pumps/compressors/metal forming machinery
Skill-intensive services Tax consulting, bookkeeping; consulting; market/opinion polling
Software supply and consultancy Programmers
Non-high-tech manufacturing Breweries, textile companies, manufacturing of shoe-ware;
copy-shops, printing; furniture, jewellery; installation of machinery
Other business-oriented services Warehouses; postal/courier activities; renting vehicles;
translators, human resources; landscape services
Cons.-or. services in creative sect. Publishers, photographers, driving schools
Consumer-oriented services Taxis; restaurants/mobile food service; repair services (computer);
hairdressers; gambling and betting activities, insurance vendors
Construction Electrical installations, floor and wall covering, painting and glazing
Retail & wholesale Sales of cars, wholesale (flowers, fruit, bicycle), retail sales
Notes: This table provides examples for the type of firms that are included in the ten industry
classification codes for which we control in all our main regressions (compare Table 1). It illustrates
that we cover a very broad set of startups and that we indeed have a comprehensive dataset of
foundations in Germany.
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Table 4: OLS Results: Actual Unemployment Duration (AUD) on Motivation of Founder and Firm Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Necessity Motive Sales Year 1 Sales Year 2 FTE Employment FTE Employment
(=1) (log) (log) Year 1 (log) Year 2 (log)
Actual unemployment duration (AUD) (in months) 0.017∗∗∗ -0.139∗∗∗ -0.096∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.027) (0.018) (0.003) (0.003)
Tertiary degree (=1) -0.050 -0.663∗∗ -0.029 0.076∗∗ 0.074∗
(0.032) (0.283) (0.168) (0.034) (0.039)
Founder was self-employed before (=1) -0.009 0.031 -0.125 -0.006 -0.018
(0.037) (0.336) (0.211) (0.040) (0.045)
Managerial experience as employee (=1) -0.059 0.169 0.618∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.350) (0.164) (0.049) (0.056)
Industry experience (in years) 0.003∗ 0.034∗∗ 0.003 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.014) (0.009) (0.001) (0.002)
Female founder (=1) 0.013 -0.993∗∗ -0.361∗ 0.069 0.104∗∗
(0.039) (0.404) (0.210) (0.046) (0.052)
Founder of non-German origin (=1) 0.033 -1.758∗∗∗ -0.509 -0.015 -0.048
(0.060) (0.673) (0.418) (0.055) (0.054)
SE Subsidy by Federal Employment Agency (=1) 0.073∗∗ -0.413 -0.289∗ -0.056∗ -0.086∗∗
(0.032) (0.280) (0.168) (0.033) (0.037)
Industry/Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1256 1039 851 1291 1272
R-sq. 0.063 0.122 0.126 0.150 0.158
Mean of dependent variable 0.35 10.074 11.271 0.271 0.361
(abs. value for log-terms) 173,661 231,293 0.605 0.847
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses and significance levels are indicated by: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. This table shows the OLS regression of our
main outcome variables (motivation for starting up; sales and employment growth after year 1, 2) on the founders’ actual unemployment duration (AUD) before starting
up. We control for the founders’ education, their previous work experience, and individual characteristics. Moreover, we include year and industry (of the startup, see
Table 3) fixed effects. We also include dummies to control for the receipt of self-employment (SE) related subsidies from the Federal Employment Agency and for
funding by the KfW bank (Appendix C.2). Our regression sample consists of non-team founders who became unemployed between 2003 and 2011, who were 35 to 65
years old when becoming unemployed, and for whom information on all included control variables is available.
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Table 5: OLS Results: Actual Unemployment Duration (AUD) on Motivation of Founder and Firm Outcomes focusing on Non-Manufacturing Sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Necessity Motive Sales Year 1 Sales Year 2 FTE Employment FTE Employment
(=1) (log) (log) Year 1 (log) Year 2 (log)
Actual unemployment duration (AUD) (in months) 0.018∗∗∗ -0.128∗∗∗ -0.102∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.029) (0.021) (0.003) (0.003)
Tertiary degree (=1) -0.069∗ -0.392 0.143 0.059∗ 0.057
(0.036) (0.290) (0.168) (0.035) (0.041)
Founder was self-employed before (=1) 0.009 0.119 -0.262 0.015 0.031
(0.042) (0.343) (0.230) (0.045) (0.051)
Managerial experience as employee (=1) -0.096∗∗ 0.022 0.457∗∗ 0.130∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.381) (0.184) (0.053) (0.060)
Industry experience (in years) 0.002 0.021 0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.015) (0.011) (0.002) (0.002)
Female founder (=1) 0.006 -0.693∗ -0.512∗∗ 0.077 0.096∗
(0.043) (0.413) (0.232) (0.051) (0.056)
Founder of non-German origin (=1) -0.047 -1.820∗∗ -0.843∗ -0.076 -0.080∗
(0.064) (0.724) (0.496) (0.047) (0.047)
SE Subsidy by Federal Employment Agency (=1) 0.070∗ -0.629∗∗ -0.277 -0.054 -0.069∗
(0.036) (0.309) (0.202) (0.035) (0.040)
Industry/Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 999 815 661 1022 1009
R-sq. 0.076 0.103 0.145 0.167 0.168
Mean of dependent variable 0.352 10.21 11.251 0.25 0.329
(abs. value for log-terms) 179,344 237,112 0.549 0.76
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses and significance levels are indicated by: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. This table shows the OLS regression of
our main outcome variables (motivation for starting up; sales and employment growth after year 1, 2) on the founders’ actual unemployment duration (AUD) before
starting up in the non-manufacturing sector (75% of our sample). We control for the founders’ education, their previous work experience, and individual characteristics.
Moreover, we include year and industry (of the startup, see Table 3) fixed effects. We also include dummies to control for the receipt of self-employment (SE) related
subsidies from the Federal Employment Agency and for funding by the KfW bank (Appendix C.2). Our regression sample consists of non-team founders who became
unemployed between 2003 and 2011, who were 35 to 65 years old when becoming unemployed, and for whom information on all included control variables is available.
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Table 6: Potential UI Benefit Duration (in months) based on Contributions/Age
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Contribution before Age from 02/2006 Age since Age
Months 02/2006 Rules until 12/2007 Rules 01/2008 Rules
12 6 6 6
18 9 9 9
24 12 12 12
30 15 ≥ 45 15 ≥ 55 15 ≥ 50
36 18 18 ≥ 55 18 ≥ 55
44 22 ≥ 47 18 ≥ 55 22 ≥ 58
48 24 18 ≥ 55 24 ≥ 58
52 26 ≥ 52 18 ≥ 55 24 ≥ 58
64 32 ≥ 57 18 ≥ 55 24 ≥ 58
Notes: The table shows how potential unemployment insurance (UI) benefit duration (PBD) varies
with the number of contribution months (column 1), i.e. the number of months a worker paid UI
contributions that are mandatory for jobs covered by the social security. The rules state that after
having satisfied the minimum eligibility requirement (e.g. at least 12 contributions within last 24
months) half of the number of contribution months translate into PBD. However, at some point a
maximum PBD is reached and additional contribution months can no longer increase PBD. This table
presents the age rules for maximum PBD, i.e. for which age groups the indicated PBD is available,
since only with increasing age does the maximum PBD increase. Maximum PBD by age group is
also shown in Table 7. Columns (2) and (3) show the PBD regime before February 2006, columns (4)
and (5) between February 2006 and December 2007 and columns (6) and (7) since January 2008.
Table 7: Maximum Potential UI Benefit Duration (in months) in Germany
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Age before Reduction from 02/2006 Extension since Net-Effect
02/2006 in months until 12/2007 in months 01/2008 in months
<45 12 0 12 0 12 0
45-46 18 -6 12 0 12 -6
47-49 22 -10 12 0 12 -10
50-51 22 -10 12 +3 15 -7
52-54 26 -14 12 +3 15 -11
55-56 26 -8 18 0 18 -8
57 32 -14 18 0 18 -14
>58 32 -14 18 +6 24 -8
Notes: The table shows how potential unemployment insurance (UI) benefit duration (PBD) varies
by age group and over time for unemployed individuals who had worked for at least the number
of contribution months within the last five years (seven years before 02/2006) necessary to get the
maximum PBD of their age group according to Table 6 without intermittent UI spell. This table
shows that the reform of February 2006 represents a considerable decline in PBD for workers aged
above 45 years. In contrast, the reform of January 2008 partially increased PBD again. However, in
total the net effect across both reforms demonstrates that all age groups beyond 45 years suffered a
considerable decline in PBD (cf. Section 3).
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Table 8: OLS Results: Potential Benefit Duration (PBD) on Actual Unemployment Duration (AUD), Motivation of Founder, and Firm Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AUD Necessity Motive Sales Year 1 Sales Year 2 FTE Employment FTE Employment
(in months) (=1) (log) (log) Year 1 (log) Year 2 (log)
Potential benefit duration (PBD) (in months) 0.471∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ -0.036 -0.049∗∗ -0.004 -0.009∗∗
(0.048) (0.003) (0.024) (0.022) (0.004) (0.004)
Tertiary degree (=1) -0.386 -0.073∗∗ -0.636∗∗ 0.027 0.079∗∗ 0.081∗∗
(0.291) (0.032) (0.289) (0.173) (0.034) (0.040)
Founder was self-employed before (=1) 0.116 -0.014 -0.001 -0.095 -0.009 -0.019
(0.338) (0.037) (0.341) (0.213) (0.040) (0.045)
Managerial experience as employee (=1) -0.004 -0.069∗ 0.160 0.609∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗
(0.346) (0.038) (0.356) (0.168) (0.050) (0.057)
Industry experience (in years) -0.013 0.001 0.036∗∗ 0.007 0.001 0.002
(0.015) (0.001) (0.014) (0.009) (0.002) (0.002)
Female founder (=1) 0.176 0.013 -1.075∗∗∗ -0.369∗ 0.065 0.100∗
(0.326) (0.039) (0.405) (0.221) (0.047) (0.053)
Founder of non-German origin (=1) 0.299 0.034 -1.853∗∗∗ -0.553 -0.021 -0.056
(0.500) (0.059) (0.674) (0.446) (0.056) (0.057)
SE Subsidy by Federal Employment Agency (=1) -0.301 0.061∗ -0.401 -0.277 -0.053 -0.080∗∗
(0.292) (0.031) (0.281) (0.171) (0.034) (0.038)
Industry/Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1291 1256 1039 851 1291 1272
R-sq. 0.256 0.077 0.099 0.096 0.133 0.134
Mean of dependent variable 4.785 0.35 10.074 11.271 0.271 0.361
(abs. value for log-terms) 173,661 231,293 0.605 0.847
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses and significance levels are indicated by: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. This table shows the OLS regression of our
main outcome variables (actual unemployment duration (AUD), motivation for starting up; sales and employment growth after year 1, 2) on the founders’ potential
benefit duration (PBD) before starting up. We control for the founders’ education, their previous work experience, and individual characteristics. Moreover, we include
year and industry (of the startup, see Table 3) fixed effects. We also include dummies to control for the receipt of self-employment (SE) related subsidies from the
Federal Employment Agency and for funding by the KfW bank (Appendix C.2). Our regression sample consists of non-team founders who became unemployed between
2003 and 2011, who were 35 to 65 years old when becoming unemployed, and for whom information on all included control variables is available.
53
Table 9: OLS Results: Potential Benefit Duration on Actual Unemployment Duration, Motivation of Founder, and Firm Outcomes for Non-Manufacturing Sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AUD Necessity Motive Sales Year 1 Sales Year 2 FTE Employment FTE Employment
(in months) (=1) (log) (log) Year 1 (log) Year 2 (log)
Potential benefit duration (PBD) (in months) 0.484∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ -0.067∗∗∗ -0.070∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.004) (0.026) (0.026) (0.003) (0.004)
Tertiary degree (=1) -0.462 -0.092∗∗∗ -0.324 0.225 0.069∗ 0.072∗
(0.335) (0.036) (0.295) (0.168) (0.036) (0.041)
Founder was self-employed before (=1) 0.443 0.015 0.065 -0.250 0.008 0.023
(0.369) (0.042) (0.351) (0.235) (0.046) (0.052)
Managerial experience as employee (=1) 0.052 -0.098∗∗ 0.005 0.430∗∗ 0.130∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗
(0.387) (0.043) (0.383) (0.188) (0.053) (0.061)
Industry experience (in years) 0.001 0.001 0.022 0.005 0.002 0.003
(0.016) (0.002) (0.015) (0.011) (0.002) (0.002)
Female founder (=1) 0.329 0.007 -0.787∗ -0.539∗∗ 0.072 0.090
(0.370) (0.043) (0.415) (0.244) (0.052) (0.057)
Founder of non-German origin (=1) 0.303 -0.040 -1.882∗∗∗ -0.876 -0.081∗ -0.088∗
(0.546) (0.065) (0.723) (0.533) (0.047) (0.049)
SE Subsidy by Federal Employment Agency (=1) -0.287 0.062∗ -0.597∗ -0.252 -0.049 -0.060
(0.342) (0.036) (0.310) (0.202) (0.036) (0.041)
Industry/Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1022 999 815 661 1022 1009
R-sq. 0.266 0.082 0.085 0.116 0.153 0.145
Mean of dependent variable 4.895 0.352 10.21 11.251 0.25 0.329
(abs. value for log-terms) 179,344 237,112 0.549 0.76
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses and significance levels are indicated by: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. This table shows the OLS regression of our
main outcome variables (actual unemployment duration (AUD), motivation for starting up; sales and employment growth after year 1, 2) on the founders’ potential
benefit duration (PBD) before starting up in the non-manufacturing sector (75% of our sample). We control for the founders’ education, their previous work experience,
and individual characteristics. Moreover, we include year and industry (of the startup, see Table 3) fixed effects. We also include dummies to control for the receipt of
self-employment (SE) related subsidies from the Federal Employment Agency and for funding by the KfW bank (Appendix C.2). Our regression sample consists of
non-team founders who became unemployed between 2003 and 2011, who were 35 to 65 years old when becoming unemployed, and for whom information on all
included control variables is available.
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Table 10: IV Results for Reform 2006: Potential Benefit Duration (PBD) on Actual Unemployment Duration (AUD), Motivation of Founder, and Firm Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
PBD AUD Necessity Motive Sales Year 1 Sales Year 2 FTE Employment FTE Employment
(in months) (in months) (=1) (log) (log) Year 1 (log) Year 2 (log)
Potential benefit duration (PBD) (in months) 0.661∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.034 -0.072∗ 0.003 -0.006
(0.094) (0.007) (0.052) (0.039) (0.007) (0.008)
Tertiary degree (=1) 0.313 -0.513∗ -0.075∗∗ -0.689∗∗ 0.048 0.071∗∗ 0.078∗∗
(0.221) (0.289) (0.032) (0.289) (0.169) (0.034) (0.039)
Founder was self-employed before (=1) -0.025 0.121 -0.022 -0.014 -0.093 -0.012 -0.020
(0.278) (0.345) (0.037) (0.339) (0.210) (0.039) (0.045)
Managerial experience as employee (=1) 0.301 -0.023 -0.077∗∗ 0.144 0.613∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗
(0.305) (0.348) (0.038) (0.353) (0.165) (0.050) (0.057)
Industry experience (in years) 0.014 -0.017 0.001 0.033∗∗ 0.009 0.001 0.001
(0.011) (0.014) (0.001) (0.015) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002)
Female founder (=1) 0.002 0.198 0.004 -1.088∗∗∗ -0.366∗ 0.063 0.099∗
(0.274) (0.325) (0.038) (0.402) (0.216) (0.046) (0.052)
Founder of non-German origin (=1) 0.021 0.207 0.042 -1.897∗∗∗ -0.530 -0.023 -0.057
(0.372) (0.505) (0.058) (0.666) (0.427) (0.055) (0.056)
SE Subsidy by Federal Employment Agency (=1) 0.398∗ -0.406 0.067∗∗ -0.437 -0.269 -0.056∗ -0.081∗∗
(0.214) (0.294) (0.031) (0.279) (0.167) (0.033) (0.038)
IV_06 -8.743∗∗∗
(0.505)
Industry/Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F-statistic 299.421 286.66 223.603 220.761 299.421 296.11
N 1291 1291 1256 1039 851 1291 1272
R-sq. 0.470 0.234 0.083 0.094 0.094 0.130 0.134
Mean of dependent variable 12.324 4.785 0.35 10.074 11.271 0.271 0.361
(abs. value for log-terms) 173,661 231,293 0.605 0.847
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses and significance levels are indicated by: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. This table shows the IV regression of our outcome
variables (AUD, motivation for starting up; sales/employment growth after year 1, 2) on the founders’ PBD before starting up that is instrumented by IV06 (Section 3.2).
Column 1 shows the first-stage regression of the IV model in column 2. We control for the founders’ education, previous work experience, and individual characteristics.
We include year and industry (of the startup, see Table 3) fixed effects, and dummies to control for the receipt of self-employment (SE) related subsidies from the
Federal Employment Agency and for funding by the KfW (Appendix C.2). Our regression sample consists of non-team founders who became unemployed between
2003 and 2011, were 35 to 65 years old when becoming unemployed, and for whom information on all control variables is available.
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Table 11: IV Results for Reform 2006: PBD on Actual Unemployment Duration, Motivation of Founder, Firm Outcomes for Non-Manufacturing Sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
PBD AUD Necessity Motive Sales Year 1 Sales Year 2 FTE Employment FTE Employment
(in months) (in months) (=1) (log) (log) Year 1 (log) Year 2 (log)
Potential benefit duration (PBD) (in months) 0.722∗∗∗ 0.010 0.004 -0.115∗∗ -0.008 -0.018∗∗
(0.109) (0.008) (0.056) (0.051) (0.006) (0.008)
Tertiary degree (=1) 0.434∗ -0.641∗ -0.089∗∗ -0.390 0.269 0.064∗ 0.071∗
(0.248) (0.331) (0.036) (0.296) (0.167) (0.036) (0.041)
Founder was self-employed before (=1) -0.296 0.517 0.006 0.078 -0.270 0.005 0.019
(0.312) (0.385) (0.042) (0.350) (0.234) (0.044) (0.051)
Managerial experience as employee (=1) 0.137 0.068 -0.105∗∗ -0.000 0.423∗∗ 0.127∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗
(0.350) (0.387) (0.042) (0.377) (0.186) (0.053) (0.060)
Industry experience (in years) 0.011 -0.006 0.001 0.019 0.008 0.002 0.002
(0.013) (0.016) (0.002) (0.016) (0.012) (0.002) (0.002)
Female founder (=1) 0.086 0.312 0.001 -0.818∗∗ -0.533∗∗ 0.069 0.088
(0.313) (0.368) (0.042) (0.412) (0.238) (0.051) (0.056)
Founder of non-German origin (=1) -0.101 0.252 -0.032 -1.922∗∗∗ -0.828 -0.079∗ -0.085∗
(0.395) (0.554) (0.063) (0.708) (0.508) (0.046) (0.048)
SE Subsidy by Federal Employment Agency (=1) 0.333 -0.389 0.071∗∗ -0.633∗∗ -0.236 -0.049 -0.058
(0.234) (0.341) (0.036) (0.307) (0.198) (0.035) (0.040)
IV_06 -8.401∗∗∗
(0.569)
Industry/Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F-statistic 217.975 209.815 155.049 153.108 217.975 216.04
N 1022 1022 999 815 661 1022 1009
R-sq. 0.477 0.232 0.083 0.079 0.110 0.153 0.145
Mean of dependent variable 12.327 4.895 0.352 10.21 11.251 0.25 0.329
(abs. value for log-terms) 179,344 237,112 0.549 0.76
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses and significance levels are indicated by: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. This table shows the IV regression of our outcome
variables (AUD, motivation for starting up; sales/employment growth after year 1, 2) on the founders’ PBD before starting up in the non-manufacturing sector (75% of
the sample) that is instrumented by IV06 (Section 3.2). Column 1 shows the first-stage regression of the IV model in column 2. We control for the founders’ education,
previous work experience, and individual characteristics. We include year and industry (of the startup, see Table 3) fixed effects, and dummies to control for the receipt
of self-employment (SE) related subsidies from the Federal Employment Agency and for funding by the KfW (Appendix C.2). Our regression sample consists of
non-team founders who became unemployed between 2003 and 2011, were 35 to 65 years old when becoming unemployed, and for whom information on all control
variables is available.
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Table 12: IV Results for Reform 2006: Actual Unemployment Duration (AUD) on Motivation of Founder and Firm Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AUD Necessity Motive Sales Year 1 Sales Year 2 FTE Employment FTE Employment
(in months) (=1) (log) (log) Year 1 (log) Year 2 (log)
Actual unemployment duration (AUD) (in months) 0.022∗∗ 0.060 -0.118∗ 0.005 -0.010
(0.010) (0.095) (0.063) (0.011) (0.012)
Tertiary degree (=1) -0.313 -0.063∗∗ -0.662∗∗ -0.030 0.074∗∗ 0.073∗
(0.311) (0.031) (0.287) (0.164) (0.034) (0.039)
Founder was self-employed before (=1) 0.067 -0.024 -0.023 -0.129 -0.013 -0.020
(0.357) (0.037) (0.343) (0.208) (0.040) (0.045)
Managerial experience as employee (=1) 0.144 -0.076∗∗ 0.146 0.624∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗
(0.380) (0.038) (0.358) (0.162) (0.050) (0.057)
Industry experience (in years) -0.008 0.001 0.035∗∗ 0.003 0.001 0.001
(0.015) (0.001) (0.015) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002)
Female founder (=1) 0.240 -0.001 -1.118∗∗∗ -0.357∗ 0.062 0.101∗
(0.361) (0.038) (0.408) (0.205) (0.047) (0.052)
Founder of non-German origin (=1) 0.226 0.037 -1.928∗∗∗ -0.489 -0.024 -0.054
(0.505) (0.059) (0.670) (0.400) (0.055) (0.054)
SE Subsidy by Federal Employment Agency (=1) -0.086 0.075∗∗ -0.423 -0.288∗ -0.054 -0.085∗∗
(0.311) (0.031) (0.281) (0.166) (0.034) (0.037)
IV_06 -5.815∗∗∗
(0.921)
Industry/Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F-statistic 39.831 23.487 24.016 40.992 41.07
N 1256 1256 1039 851 1291 1272
R-sq. 0.189 0.075 0.072 0.124 0.120 0.149
Mean of dependent variable 4.828 0.35 10.074 11.271 0.271 0.361
(abs. value for log-terms) 173,661 231,293 0.605 0.847
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses and significance levels are indicated by: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. This table shows the IV regression of our outcome
variables (motivation for starting up; sales/employment growth after year 1, 2) on the founders’ actual unemployment duration (AUD) before starting up that is
instrumented by IV06 (Section 3.2). Column 1 shows the first-stage regression of the IV model in column 2. We control for the founders’ education, previous
work experience, and individual characteristics. We include year and industry (of the startup, see Table 3) fixed effects, and dummies to control for the receipt of
self-employment (SE) related subsidies from the Federal Employment Agency and for funding by the KfW (Appendix C.2). Our regression sample consists of non-team
founders who became unemployed between 2003 and 2011, were 35 to 65 years old when becoming unemployed, and for whom information on all control variables is
available.
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Table 13: IV Results for Reform 2006: Actual Unemployment Duration (AUD) on Motivation of Founder and Firm Outcomes for Non-Manufacturing Sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AUD Necessity Motive Sales Year 1 Sales Year 2 (log) FTE Employment FTE Employment
(in months) (=1) (log) (log) Year 1 (log) Year 2 (log)
Actual unemployment duration (AUD) (in months) 0.014 0.007 -0.171∗∗ -0.011 -0.025∗∗
(0.011) (0.092) (0.077) (0.009) (0.011)
Tertiary degree (=1) -0.305 -0.081∗∗ -0.387 0.145 0.057 0.056
(0.357) (0.035) (0.289) (0.163) (0.035) (0.040)
Founder was self-employed before (=1) 0.243 -0.001 0.074 -0.283 0.011 0.030
(0.374) (0.042) (0.346) (0.228) (0.044) (0.050)
Managerial experience as employee (=1) 0.158 -0.105∗∗ -0.001 0.475∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗
(0.434) (0.042) (0.380) (0.183) (0.053) (0.060)
Industry experience (in years) 0.002 0.001 0.019 0.002 0.001 0.002
(0.017) (0.002) (0.016) (0.012) (0.002) (0.002)
Female founder (=1) 0.356 -0.003 -0.823∗∗ -0.485∗∗ 0.072 0.095∗
(0.407) (0.042) (0.419) (0.227) (0.051) (0.055)
Founder of non-German origin (=1) 0.198 -0.035 -1.925∗∗∗ -0.781∗ -0.076∗ -0.078∗
(0.551) (0.063) (0.709) (0.464) (0.046) (0.047)
SE Subsidy by Federal Employment Agency (=1) -0.084 0.075∗∗ -0.631∗∗ -0.280 -0.053 -0.068∗
(0.367) (0.035) (0.306) (0.201) (0.035) (0.039)
IV_06 -5.987∗∗∗
(1.047)
Industry/Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F-statistic 32.673 19.62 19.994 34.939 34.852
N 999 999 815 661 1022 1009
R-sq. 0.209 0.089 0.077 0.124 0.165 0.168
Mean of dependent variable 4.926 0.352 10.21 11.251 0.25 0.329
(abs. value for log-terms) 179,344 237,112 0.549 0.76
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses and significance levels are indicated by: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. This table shows the IV regression of our outcome
variables (motivation for starting up; sales/employment growth after year 1, 2) on the founders’ actual unemployment duration (AUD) before starting up in the
non-manufacturing sector (75% of the sample) that is instrumented by IV06 (Section 3.2). Column 1 shows the first-stage regression of the IV model in column 2. We
control for the founders’ education, previous work experience, and individual characteristics. We include year and industry (of the startup, see Table 3) fixed effects, and
dummies to control for the receipt of self-employment (SE) related subsidies from the Federal Employment Agency and for funding by the KfW (Appendix C.2). Our
regression sample consists of non-team founders who became unemployed between 2003 and 2011, were 35 to 65 years old when becoming unemployed, and for whom
information on all control variables is available.
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Table 14: Composition or Individual-Level Duration Effects as Mechanism: Analyzing (Observable) Composition Changes
Treated unemployed All unemployed "Treated" non-unemployed All non-unemployed
from main sample from main sample from comparison group from comparison group
Mean Mean After Mean Mean After Mean Mean After Mean Mean After
(before) (after) -before (before) (after) -before (before) (after) -before (before) (after) -before
N=106 N=397 N=259 N=1032 N=94 N=509 N=256 N=1354
Actual unemployment duration (AUD) (in months) 11.171 4.873 -6.299*** 7.943 4.193 -3.75***
Tertiary degree (=1) 0.33 0.28 -0.05 0.20 0.23 0.03 0.32 0.30 -0.03 0.35 0.25 -0.10*
Founder was self-employed before (=1) 0.17 0.19 0.02 0.15 0.18 0.03 0.26 0.32 0.05 0.25 0.27 0.01
Managerial experience as employee (=1) 0.17 0.15 -0.02 0.13 0.13 0.00 0.16 0.19 0.03 0.14 0.16 0.02
Industry experience (in years) 20.02 18.81 -1.22 16.10 16.31 0.21 22.71 17.27 -5.44*** 17.15 15.38 -1.77
Female founder (=1) 0.17 0.25 0.08 0.13 0.20 0.07 0.18 0.23 0.05 0.14 0.20 0.06
Founder of non-German origin (=1) 0.08 0.04 -0.03 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.08 0.05 -0.02 0.06 0.07 0.01
SE Subsidy by Federal Employment Agency (=1) 0.65 0.80 0.15* 0.65 0.80 0.15*** 0.27 0.34 0.07 0.30 0.36 0.06
Technology-intensive services 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.06 0.00
High-technology manufacturing 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01*** 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
Skill-intensive services 0.06 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.09 0.07 -0.02
Software supply and consultancy 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00* 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00
Non-high-tech manufacturing 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.02***
Other business-oriented services 0.07 0.11 0.04 0.10 0.14 0.03 0.04 0.12 0.08* 0.12 0.12 -0.01
Cons.-or. services in creative sect. 0.08 0.02 -0.06 0.10 0.05 -0.05 0.24 0.11 -0.13 0.15 0.09 -0.06
Consumer-oriented services 0.30 0.31 0.01 0.26 0.26 0.00 0.15 0.24 0.09 0.14 0.23 0.10*
Construction 0.11 0.20 0.09* 0.19 0.20 0.01 0.12 0.10 -0.02 0.16 0.14 -0.02
Retail & wholesale 0.29 0.17 -0.12 0.21 0.18 -0.03 0.28 0.21 -0.07 0.24 0.22 -0.02
Average daily wage in 5 years before founding 107.87 124.75 16.88 96.87 106.56 9.69 129.17 125.10 -4.06 127.03 119.66 -7.37
Notes: Significance levels are indicated by: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. This table show t-test comparison of different subgroups for the observable characteristics. In the
first panel, we compare those unemployed individuals that are affected by 2006 reform. In the second panel, we compare all unemployed individuals before and after the
2006 reform. In the third panel, we compare the potentially treated non-unemployed and in the fourth panel, we do so for all non-unemployed individuals. Results
suggest that composition and individual-level duration effects play a role in explaining the overall effects but that the size of (observable) compositions effects is limited.)
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A Appendix: Tables & Figures
A.1 Figures
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Notes: This Figure shows the difference between actual and potential unemployment duration, i.e. when the
unemployed individual starts a firm given his/her remaining PBD. The Figure shows that when UI benefits
run out (remaining PBD is close to 0) the spike in the exit rate from unemployment to self-employment is
significantly higher for those indicating to start a firm due to necessity motives (red lines) compared to
those indicating an opportunity motive (blue dashed spikes). Thus, it is plausible to use the term pushed
for necessity-driven founders (cf. Section 2). For a review of the literature on UI spikes, see also Card et al.
(2007).
Figure A.2: RDD-Strategy McCrary Test for Age 50 Cutoff in 2008-2011
McCrary Test:


















44 46 48 50 52 54
Age at entry into unemployment
Notes: This Figure shows the necessary checks concerning the identifying assumption of the Regression
Discontinuity Design (RDD) strategy. This involves conducting a McCrary test that confirms that eligible
persons are not strategically becoming unemployed to exploit the age discontinuity in order to optimize
their potential benefit duration (PBD). See also Section 4.2.1.
60
Figure A.3: RDD-Results for Age 50 Cutoff in 2008-2011: Exogenous Increase of 3 months in
PBD
(a) RDD-Results: Increase in Potential Benefit Duration (PBD)
Treatment effect (S.E.) = 2.079 (.427)























Age at entry into unemployment
(b) RDD-Effect of 3 months Increase in PBD on Actual Unemployment Duration
Treatment effect (S.E.) = 1.182 (.663)





























Age at entry into unemployment
Notes: This Figure shows in (a) that potential benefit duration increases by approximately 3 months
around the age 50 cutoff, thus it confirms that our data construction process has been successful.
Moreover Figure (b) shows regression discontinuity design (RDD) results for the actual unemploy-
ment duration of non-team founders (age 45-54) who have become unemployed. Consistent with our
IV estimates longer PBD increases actual unemployment duration (AUD). For details on the RDD
strategy, see Section 4.2.1.
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Figure A.4: RDD-Results for Age 50 Cutoff in 2008-2011: Exogenous Increase of 3 months in
PBD
(a) RDD-Results: Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) Employment after Year 1
Treatment effect (S.E.) = -.123 (.078)
























Age at entry into unemployment
(b) RDD-Results: Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) Employment after Year 2
Treatment effect (S.E.) = -.247 (.098)

























Age at entry into unemployment
Notes: This Figure shows regression discontinuity design (RDD) results for employment growth
outcomes of non-team founders (age 45-54) who have been previously unemployed. Consistent with
our IV estimates longer actual unemployment duration induced by longer PBD leads to less growth
in terms of FTE employment. For details on the RDD strategy, see Section 4.2.1. Detailed results are
shown in Table A.5.
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A.2 Tables
Table A.1: IV Results for Reforms 2006 & 2008: Potential Benefit Duration (PBD) on Actual Unemployment Duration, Motivation of Founder, and Firm Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
PBD AUD Necessity Motive Sales Year 1 Sales Year 2 FTE Employment FTE Employment
(in months) (in months) (=1) (log) (log) Year 1 (log) Year 2 (log)
Potential benefit duration (PBD) (in months) 0.649∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.030 -0.074∗∗ 0.004 -0.006
(0.093) (0.007) (0.049) (0.038) (0.007) (0.008)
Tertiary degree (=1) 0.247 -0.467 -0.076∗∗ -0.671∗∗ 0.057 0.075∗∗ 0.080∗∗
(0.217) (0.286) (0.032) (0.288) (0.168) (0.034) (0.040)
Founder was self-employed before (=1) -0.157 0.185 -0.025 0.012 -0.082 -0.006 -0.018
(0.268) (0.342) (0.037) (0.338) (0.207) (0.039) (0.045)
Managerial experience as employee (=1) 0.291 -0.006 -0.077∗∗ 0.150 0.615∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗
(0.302) (0.346) (0.038) (0.353) (0.165) (0.050) (0.057)
Industry experience (in years) 0.008 -0.014 0.000 0.034∗∗ 0.009 0.001 0.001
(0.011) (0.014) (0.001) (0.015) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002)
Female founder (=1) -0.015 0.186 0.005 -1.100∗∗∗ -0.368∗ 0.062 0.099∗
(0.273) (0.321) (0.038) (0.401) (0.216) (0.047) (0.052)
Founder of non-German origin (=1) 0.134 0.219 0.042 -1.899∗∗∗ -0.535 -0.022 -0.057
(0.364) (0.504) (0.058) (0.666) (0.427) (0.054) (0.056)
SE Subsidy by Federal Employment Agency (=1) 0.446∗∗ -0.411 0.067∗∗ -0.446 -0.272 -0.058∗ -0.081∗∗





Industry/Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F-statistic 41.07 147.61 115.608 119.869 154.434 152.383
N 1291 1291 1256 1039 851 1291 1272
R-sq. 0.487 0.242 0.084 0.096 0.094 0.133 0.135
Mean of dependent variable 12.324 4.785 0.35 10.074 11.271 0.271 0.361
(abs. value for log-terms) 173,661 231,293 0.605 0.847
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses and significance levels are indicated by: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. This table shows the IV regression of our outcome
variables (actual unemployment duration (AUD), motivation for starting up; sales/employment growth after year 1, 2) on the founders’ PBD before starting up that is
instrumented by IV06 and IV08 (Section 3.2). Column 1 shows the first-stage regression of the IV model in column 2. We control for the founders’ education, previous
work experience, and individual characteristics. We include year and industry (of the startup, see Table 3) fixed effects, and dummies to control for the receipt of
self-employment (SE) related subsidies from the Federal Employment Agency and for funding by the KfW (Appendix C.2). Our regression sample consists of non-team
founders who became unemployed between 2003 and 2011, were 35 to 65 years old when becoming unemployed, and for whom all control variables are available.
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Table A.2: IV Results for Reforms 2006 & 2008: PBD on Actual Unemployment Duration, Motiv. of Founder, Firm Outcomes for Non-Manufacturing Sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
PBD AUD Necessity Motive Sales Year 1 Sales Year 2 FTE Employment FTE Employment
(in months) (in months) (=1) (log) (log) Year 1 (log) Year 2 (log)
Potential benefit duration (PBD) (in months) 0.721∗∗∗ 0.010 -0.002 -0.115∗∗ -0.007 -0.017∗∗
(0.108) (0.008) (0.055) (0.050) (0.007) (0.008)
Tertiary degree (=1) 0.391 -0.585∗ -0.091∗∗ -0.371 0.266 0.066∗ 0.072∗
(0.244) (0.327) (0.036) (0.295) (0.166) (0.036) (0.041)
Founder was self-employed before (=1) -0.396 0.595 0.003 0.097 -0.275 0.009 0.021
(0.304) (0.380) (0.042) (0.352) (0.233) (0.044) (0.051)
Managerial experience as employee (=1) 0.112 0.096 -0.106∗∗ 0.006 0.422∗∗ 0.128∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗
(0.348) (0.381) (0.043) (0.378) (0.185) (0.053) (0.060)
Industry experience (in years) 0.006 -0.003 0.001 0.020 0.008 0.002 0.002
(0.012) (0.016) (0.002) (0.016) (0.012) (0.002) (0.002)
Female founder (=1) 0.065 0.298 0.002 -0.825∗∗ -0.533∗∗ 0.068 0.088
(0.312) (0.362) (0.042) (0.411) (0.238) (0.051) (0.056)
Founder of non-German origin (=1) 0.031 0.214 -0.030 -1.928∗∗∗ -0.824 -0.081∗ -0.086∗
(0.386) (0.558) (0.063) (0.710) (0.510) (0.046) (0.048)
SE Subsidy by Federal Employment Agency (=1) 0.378 -0.409 0.071∗∗ -0.636∗∗ -0.234 -0.050 -0.058





Industry/Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F-statistic 34.852 107.841 78.456 84.474 112.178 110.896
N 1022 1022 999 815 661 1022 1009
R-sq. 0.493 0.241 0.084 0.080 0.110 0.155 0.146
Mean of dependent variable 12.327 4.895 0.352 10.21 11.251 0.25 0.329
(abs. value for log-terms) 179,344 237,112 0.549 0.76
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses and significance levels are indicated by: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. This table shows the IV regression of our outcome
variables (AUD, motivation for starting up; sales/employment growth after year 1, 2) on the founders’ PBD before starting up in the non-manufacturing sector (75% of
the sample) that is instrumented by IV06 and IV08 (Section 3.2). Column 1 shows the first-stage regression of the IV model in column 2. We control for the founders’
education, previous work experience, and individual characteristics. We include year and industry (of the startup, see Table 3) fixed effects, and dummies to control
for the receipt of self-employment (SE) related subsidies from the Federal Employment Agency and for funding by the KfW (Appendix C.2). Our regression sample
consists of non-team founders who became unemployed between 2003 and 2011, were 35 to 65 years old when becoming unemployed, and for whom information on all
control variables is available.
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Table A.3: IV Results for Reforms 2006 & 2008: Actual Unemployment Duration (AUD) on Motivation of Founder and Firm Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AUD Necessity Motive Sales Year 1 Sales Year 2 FTE Employment FTE Employment
(in months) (=1) (log) (log) Year 1 (log) Year 2 (log)
Actual unemployment duration (AUD) (in months) 0.023∗∗ 0.058 -0.121∗ 0.004 -0.010
(0.010) (0.095) (0.063) (0.011) (0.012)
Tertiary degree (=1) -0.314 -0.065∗∗ -0.649∗∗ -0.019 0.077∗∗ 0.075∗
(0.311) (0.031) (0.287) (0.163) (0.034) (0.039)
Founder was self-employed before (=1) 0.065 -0.029 -0.002 -0.111 -0.007 -0.016
(0.358) (0.037) (0.342) (0.205) (0.040) (0.045)
Managerial experience as employee (=1) 0.143 -0.077∗∗ 0.150 0.627∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗
(0.381) (0.038) (0.358) (0.161) (0.050) (0.056)
Industry experience (in years) -0.008 0.001 0.036∗∗ 0.004 0.001 0.001
(0.015) (0.001) (0.015) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002)
Female founder (=1) 0.242 -0.001 -1.126∗∗∗ -0.361∗ 0.061 0.100∗
(0.361) (0.038) (0.407) (0.204) (0.047) (0.052)
Founder of non-German origin (=1) 0.222 0.036 -1.930∗∗∗ -0.497 -0.023 -0.053
(0.505) (0.058) (0.670) (0.397) (0.055) (0.054)
SE Subsidy by Federal Employment Agency (=1) -0.087 0.075∗∗ -0.431 -0.295∗ -0.056∗ -0.085∗∗





Industry/Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F-statistic 152.383 11.84 12.17 20.8 20.98
N 1256 1256 1039 851 1291 1272
R-sq. 0.189 0.077 0.073 0.125 0.124 0.151
Mean of dependent variable 4.828 0.35 10.074 11.271 0.271 0.361
(abs. value) 173,661 231,293 0.605 0.847
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses and significance levels are indicated by: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. This table shows the IV regression of our outcome
variables (motivation for starting up; sales/employment growth after year 1, 2) on the founders’ actual unemployment duration (AUD) before starting up that is
instrumented by IV06 and IV08 (Section 3.2). Column 1 shows the first-stage regression of the IV model in column 2. We control for the founders’ education, previous
work experience, and individual characteristics. We include year and industry (of the startup, see Table 3) fixed effects, and dummies to control for the receipt of
self-employment (SE) related subsidies from the Federal Employment Agency and for funding by the KfW (Appendix C.2). Our regression sample consists of non-team
founders who became unemployed between 2003 and 2011, were 35 to 65 years old when becoming unemployed, and for whom information on all control variables is
available.
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Table A.4: IV Results for Reforms 2006 & 2008: Actual Unemployment Duration on Motivation of Founder and Firm Outcomes for Non-Manufacturing Sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AUD Necessity Motive Sales Year 1 Sales Year 2 FTE Employment FTE Employment
(in months) (=1) (log) (log) Year 1 (log) Year 2 (log)
Actual unemployment duration (AUD) (in months) 0.014 0.005 -0.166∗∗ -0.011 -0.025∗∗
(0.011) (0.091) (0.075) (0.009) (0.011)
Tertiary degree (=1) -0.300 -0.083∗∗ -0.372 0.153 0.060∗ 0.059
(0.356) (0.035) (0.290) (0.161) (0.035) (0.041)
Founder was self-employed before (=1) 0.252 -0.005 0.096 -0.271 0.015 0.034
(0.376) (0.042) (0.346) (0.225) (0.044) (0.050)
Managerial experience as employee (=1) 0.160 -0.107∗∗ 0.005 0.475∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗
(0.435) (0.042) (0.381) (0.182) (0.053) (0.060)
Industry experience (in years) 0.003 0.001 0.020 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.017) (0.002) (0.016) (0.012) (0.002) (0.002)
Female founder (=1) 0.355 -0.002 -0.830∗∗ -0.488∗∗ 0.071 0.095∗
(0.406) (0.042) (0.418) (0.226) (0.051) (0.055)
Founder of non-German origin (=1) 0.189 -0.033 -1.934∗∗∗ -0.793∗ -0.079∗ -0.079∗
(0.552) (0.063) (0.710) (0.464) (0.046) (0.047)
SE Subsidy by Federal Employment Agency (=1) -0.086 0.075∗∗ -0.637∗∗ -0.283 -0.054 -0.069∗





Industry/Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F-statistic 110.896 10.01 10.13 17.61 17.7
N 999 999 815 661 1022 1009
R-sq. 0.209 0.090 0.078 0.128 0.168 0.169
Mean of dependent variable 4.926 0.352 10.21 11.251 0.25 0.329
(abs. value for log-terms) 179,344 237,112 0.549 0.76
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses and significance levels are indicated by: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. This table shows the IV regression of our outcome
variables (motivation for starting up; sales/employment growth after year 1, 2) on the founders’ actual unemployment duration (AUD) before starting up in the
non-manufacturing sector (75% of the sample) that is instrumented by IV06 and IV08 (Section 3.2). Column 1 shows the first-stage regression of the IV model in
column 2. We control for the founders’ education, previous work experience, and individual characteristics. We include year and industry (of the startup, see Table 3)
fixed effects, and dummies to control for the receipt of self-employment (SE) related subsidies from the Federal Employment Agency and for funding by the KfW
(Appendix C.2). Our regression sample consists of non-team founders who became unemployed between 2003 and 2011, were 35 to 65 years old when becoming
unemployed, and for whom information on all control variables is available.
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Table A.5: Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) Results: Exogenous Increase of 3 months in
PBD at age 50 cutoff
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PBD AUD FTE Employment FTE Employment
(in months) (in months) Year 1 (log) Year 2 (log)
RDD Treatment Effect 2.079∗∗∗ 1.182∗ -0.123 -0.247∗∗
(0.427) (0.663) (0.078) (0.098)
Tertiary degree (=1) 0.536 0.103 0.048 0.051
(0.333) (0.404) (0.065) (0.060)
Founder was self-employed -0.614∗∗ 0.720 0.000 0.025
before (=1) -0.022 (0.556) (0.058) (0.076)
Managerial experience -0.022 0.188 0.196∗∗ 0.194∗∗
as employee (=1) (0.269) (0.389) (0.071) (0.075)
Industry experience 0.003 -0.013 0.002 0.001
(in years) (0.010) (0.021) (0.003) (0.003)
Female founder (=1) -0.265 0.233 0.179∗ 0.097
(0.237) (0.508) (0.096) (0.084)
Founder of 0.129 0.248 0.050 -0.037
non-German origin (=1) (0.749) (0.804) (0.076) (0.093)
SE Subsidy by Federal 0.871∗∗∗ -0.568 -0.140∗∗∗ -0.086
Employment Agency (=1) (0.241) (0.549) (0.042) (0.058)
Industry/Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 419 438 438 428
R2 0.299 0.083 0.156 0.165
Mean of dependent variable 12.254 4.49 0.279 0.367
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses and significance levels are indicated by: *** 1%, **
5%, * 10%. This table shows the regression discontinuity design (RDD) results for an exogenous
increase of 3 months in PBD at the age 50 cutoff in 2008-2011.This table shows the RDD regression
of our outcome variables (PBD, AUD, employment growth after year 1, 2) on an increase of PBD of
around 3 months before starting up (Section 4.2.1). We control for the founders’ education; previous
work experience; and individual characteristics. We include year and industry (of the startup, see
Table 3) fixed effects; and dummies to control for subsidies from the Federal Employment Agency and
for funding by the KfW (Appendix C.2). Our regression sample consists of non-team founders who
became unemployed between 2008 and 2011, were 45 to 54 years old when becoming unemployed,
and for whom information on all control variables is available.
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Table A.6: DiD Results for 2006 Reform: Reduction of at least 3 months in Potential Benefit Duration (PBD)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AUD Necessity Motive Sales Year 1 Sales Year 2 FTE Employment FTE Employment
(in months) (=1) (log) (log) Year 1 (log) Year 2 (log)
Treatment Effect -3.582∗∗∗ -0.094 -0.253 0.413 -0.041 -0.005
=Treated*After (0.884) (0.070) (0.494) (0.345) (0.062) (0.072)
Treated 4.254∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗ 0.142 -0.491 0.043 -0.013
(0.853) (0.063) (0.419) (0.320) (0.054) (0.064)
After -5.091∗∗∗ -0.087 -0.093 0.417 0.030 0.142∗
(0.605) (0.071) (0.517) (0.378) (0.062) (0.074)
Tertiary degree (=1) -0.217 -0.068∗∗ -0.679∗∗ 0.007 0.072∗∗ 0.074∗
(0.294) (0.032) (0.289) (0.173) (0.034) (0.040)
Founder was self-employed before (=1) 0.061 -0.023 -0.016 -0.082 -0.012 -0.019
(0.335) (0.037) (0.343) (0.213) (0.040) (0.045)
Managerial experience as employee (=1) 0.179 -0.072∗ 0.150 0.592∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗
(0.368) (0.039) (0.358) (0.169) (0.050) (0.058)
Industry experience (in years) -0.001 0.001 0.034∗∗ 0.006 0.001 0.001
(0.015) (0.002) (0.015) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002)
Female founder (=1) 0.112 0.003 -1.090∗∗∗ -0.358 0.064 0.102∗
(0.337) (0.039) (0.409) (0.218) (0.047) (0.053)
Founder of non-German origin (=1) 0.253 0.042 -1.891∗∗∗ -0.572 -0.023 -0.057
(0.479) (0.060) (0.676) (0.437) (0.056) (0.057)
SE Subsidy by Federal Employment Agency (=1) -0.157 0.072∗∗ -0.427 -0.285∗ -0.055 -0.083∗∗
(0.297) (0.032) (0.282) (0.169) (0.034) (0.038)
Industry/Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1291 1256 1039 851 1291 1272
R-sq. 0.231 0.068 0.098 0.094 0.132 0.133
Mean of dependent variable 145.637 0.35 10.074 11.271 0.271 0.361
(abs. value for log-terms) 173,661 231,293 0.605 0.847
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses and significance levels are indicated by: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. This table shows the DiD regression of our outcome
variables (actual unemployment duration (AUD), motivation for starting up; sales/employment growth after year 1, 2) on a decrease of PBD of around 6 months, before
starting up (Section 4.2.3). We control for the founders’ education, previous work experience, and individual characteristics. We include year and industry (of the startup,
see Table 3) fixed effects, and dummies to control for the receipt of self-employment (SE) related subsidies from the Federal Employment Agency and for funding by the
KfW (Appendix C.2). Our regression sample consists of non-team founders who became unemployed between 2003 and 2011, were 35 to 65 years old when becoming
unemployed, and for whom information on all control variables is available.
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Table A.7: DiD Results for 2006 Reform: Reduction of at least 3 months in Potential Benefit Duration (PBD) focusing on the Non-Manufacturing Sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AUD Necessity Motive Sales Year 1 Sales Year 2 FTE Employment FTE Employment
(in months) (=1) (log) (log) Year 1 (log) Year 2 (log)
Treatment Effect -3.997∗∗∗ -0.070 0.090 0.698∗ 0.041 0.087
=Treated*After (1.006) (0.078) (0.511) (0.415) (0.058) (0.071)
Treated 4.885∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗ -0.231 -0.776∗∗ -0.033 -0.096
(0.971) (0.071) (0.427) (0.391) (0.048) (0.061)
After -5.004∗∗∗ -0.032 -0.302 0.442 0.063 0.159∗∗
(0.686) (0.082) (0.600) (0.450) (0.062) (0.074)
Tertiary degree (=1) -0.222 -0.084∗∗ -0.381 0.178 0.059 0.060
(0.337) (0.036) (0.295) (0.173) (0.036) (0.042)
Founder was self-employed before (=1) 0.203 0.002 0.073 -0.220 0.009 0.029
(0.356) (0.042) (0.354) (0.233) (0.045) (0.052)
Managerial experience as employee (=1) 0.226 -0.103∗∗ 0.002 0.412∗∗ 0.125∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗
(0.419) (0.043) (0.384) (0.190) (0.054) (0.062)
Industry experience (in years) 0.006 0.001 0.019 0.003 0.001 0.002
(0.017) (0.002) (0.016) (0.012) (0.002) (0.002)
Female founder (=1) 0.290 0.001 -0.829∗∗ -0.525∗∗ 0.069 0.090
(0.384) (0.043) (0.421) (0.240) (0.052) (0.057)
Founder of non-German origin (=1) 0.255 -0.032 -1.920∗∗∗ -0.878∗ -0.079∗ -0.086∗
(0.517) (0.065) (0.721) (0.518) (0.047) (0.050)
SE Subsidy by Federal Employment Agency (=1) -0.142 0.074∗∗ -0.634∗∗ -0.266 -0.051 -0.064
(0.348) (0.037) (0.311) (0.201) (0.036) (0.041)
Industry/Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1022 999 815 661 1022 1009
R-sq. 0.252 0.071 0.080 0.112 0.147 0.141
Mean of dependent variable 149.003 0.352 10.21 11.251 0.25 0.329
(abs. value for log-terms) 179,344 237,112 0.549 0.76
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses and significance levels are indicated by: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. This table shows the DiD regression of our outcome
variables (actual unemployment duration (AUD), motivation for starting up; sales/employment growth after year 1, 2) on a decrease of PBD of around 6 months (Section
4.2.3), before starting up in the non-manufacturing sector (75% of the sample). We control for the founders’ education, previous work experience, and individual
characteristics. We include year and industry (of the startup, see Table 3) fixed effects, and dummies to control for the receipt of self-employment (SE) related subsidies
from the Federal Employment Agency and for funding by the KfW (Appendix C.2). Our regression sample consists of non-team founders who became unemployed
between 2003 and 2011, were 35 to 65 years old when becoming unemployed, and for whom information on all control variables is available.
69
Table A.8: OLS - Actual Unemployment Duration (AUD) - Controlled vs. Uncontrolled
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Necessity Motive Sales Year 1 Sales Year 2 FTE Employment FTE Employment
(=1) (log) (log) Year 1 (log) Year 2 (log)
Actual unemployment duration (AUD) 0.017∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ -0.139∗∗∗ -0.141∗∗∗ -0.096∗∗∗ -0.104∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗
(in months) (0.003) (0.003) (0.027) (0.028) (0.018) (0.021) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
CONTROLS Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
N 1256 1256 1039 1039 851 851 1291 1291 1272 1272
R-sq. 0.063 0.026 0.122 0.028 0.126 0.049 0.150 0.023 0.158 0.034
Mean of dependent variable 0.35 0.35 10.074 10.074 11.271 11.271 0.271 0.271 0.361 0.361
(abs. value for log-terms) 173,661 173,661 231,293 231,293 0.605 0.605 0.847 0.847
Table A.9: OLS - Potential Benefit Duration (PBD) - Controlled vs. Uncontrolled
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AUD Necessity Motive Sales Year 1 Sales Year 2 FTE Employment FTE Employment
(in months) (=1) (log) (log) Year 1 (log) Year 2 (log)
Potential benefit duration (PBD) 0.471∗∗∗ 0.498∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ -0.036 -0.045∗ -0.049∗∗ -0.053∗∗ -0.004 -0.008∗∗ -0.009∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗
(in months) (0.048) (0.048) (0.003) (0.003) (0.024) (0.024) (0.022) (0.022) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
CONTROLS Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
N 1291 1291 1256 1256 1039 1039 851 851 1291 1291 1272 1272
R-sq. 0.256 0.215 0.077 0.044 0.099 0.003 0.096 0.012 0.133 0.004 0.134 0.008
Mean of dependent variable 4.785 4.785 0.35 0.35 10.074 10.074 11.271 11.271 0.271 0.271 0.361 0.361
(abs. value for log-terms) 173,661 173,661 231,293 231,293 0.605 0.605 0.847 0.847
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses and significance levels are indicated by: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. These tables show the OLS regression of our main
outcome variables (motivation for starting up; sales/employment growth after year 1, 2) on the founders’ actual and potential benefit duration (AUD and PBD) before
starting up. We analyze to which extent controls for founders’ education, previous work experience and individual characteristics affect results compared to the standard
case without controls. The fact that there are no remarkable differences shows that composition effects are limited.
70
Table A.10: IV - Actual Unemployment Duration (AUD) - Controlled vs. Uncontrolled
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AUD Necessity Motive Sales Year 1 Sales Year 2 FTE Employment FTE Employment
(in months) (=1) (log) (log) Year 1 (log) Year 2 (log)
Actual unemployment duration (AUD) 0.022∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.060 0.145 -0.118∗ -0.115∗ 0.005 -0.008 -0.010 -0.017
(in months) (0.010) (0.010) (0.095) (0.092) (0.063) (0.066) (0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011)
IV_06 -5.815∗∗∗ -5.695∗∗∗
(0.921) (0.846)
CONTROLS Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
First-stage F-statistic 39.831 45.318 23.487 26.687 24.016 23.626 40.992 45.866 41.07 45.886
N 1256 1256 1256 1256 1039 1039 851 851 1291 1291 1272 1272
R-sq. 0.189 0.135 0.075 0.021 0.072 . 0.124 0.048 0.120 0.016 0.149 0.032
Mean of dependent variable 4.828 4.828 0.35 0.35 10.074 10.074 11.271 11.271 0.271 0.271 0.361 0.361
(abs. value for log-terms) 173,661 173,661 231,293 231,293 0.605 0.605 0.847 0.847
Table A.11: IV - Potential Benefit Duration (PBD) - Controlled vs. Uncontrolled
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
PBD AUD Necessity Motive Sales Year 1 Sales Year 2 FTE Employment FTE Employment
(in months) (in months) (=1) (log) (log) Year 1 (log) Year 2 (log)
Potential benefit duration (PBD) 0.661∗∗∗ 0.677∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.034 0.084∗ -0.072∗ -0.068∗ 0.003 -0.005 -0.006 -0.012
(in months) (0.094) (0.094) (0.007) (0.006) (0.052) (0.048) (0.039) (0.040) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
IV_06 -8.743∗∗∗ -8.322∗∗∗
(0.505) (0.459)
CONTROLS Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
First-stage F-statistic 299.421 328.397 286.66 319.312 223.603 242.271 220.761 219.543 299.421 328.397 296.11 325.42
N 1291 1291 1291 1291 1256 1256 1039 1039 851 851 1291 1291 1272 1272
R-sq. 0.470 0.434 0.234 0.194 0.083 0.049 0.094 . 0.094 0.011 0.130 0.004 0.134 0.009
Mean of dependent variable 12.324 12.324 4.785 4.785 0.35 0.35 10.074 10.074 11.271 11.271 0.271 0.271 0.361 0.361
(abs. value for log-terms) 173,661 173,661 231,293 231,293 0.605 0.605 0.847 0.847
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses and significance levels are indicated by: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. These tables show the IV regression of our outcome
variables (motivation for starting up; sales/employment growth after year 1, 2) on the founders’ actual and potential benefit duration (AUD and PBD) before starting up
that are instrumented by IV06 (Section 3.2). We analyze to which extent controls for founders’ education, previous work experience and individual characteristics affect
results compared to the standard case without controls. The fact that there are no remarkable differences shows that composition effects are limited.
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B Appendix: Technical Details of Data Construction
B.1 Details on the created linked dataset and the matching procedure
The IAB/ZEW Start-Up Panel is a random sample drawn from the “universe” of the Mannheim
Enterprise Panel (“MUP”). The MUP is collected by Creditreform (Germany’s largest credit rating
agency) and processed by ZEW. It covers basic information (addresses, phone numbers, industry,
incorporation status, survival) about all “economically active” firms in Germany. This is guaranteed by
automated synchronization of data with official commercial registers and the Chambers of Industry
and Commerce (IHKs), as well as by active search for new firms by local Creditreform offices, which
usually also receive a request for conducting a credit rating when new firms enter the market.
Only independent new firms are sampled for the Start-Up Panel survey, which means that all
startups are included, except: subsidiaries or new establishments of existing firms and business
succession (also in case of insolvency) are excluded. In contrast, joint ventures and franchise are
included. Moreover, a maximum of 75% of a firm’s shares may be held by other firms. In conclusion,
the interviewee entering into the Start-Up Panel is financially engaged in the firm and usually the
single founder or one member of a founding team. The Start-Up Panel is a stratified random sample.
Stratification is based on KfW funding (until 2011), founding year, and industry. A detailed first
interview is supposed to take place within one year after the firm has been started. Only a small
proportion of firms is first sampled up to three years after foundation to balance small stratification
cells (they can be excluded). Shorter follow-up surveys are then conducted in subsequent years. Each
startup stays in the sample for up to seven interviews or until they drop out by missing two subsequent
interviews. All information is retrieved by computer-assisted telephone interviews.
This firm-level survey data is matched to person-specific employment register data on the startups’
founders and employees. The employment register data contain information on all employees who are
subject to social security contributions in Germany. This includes apprentices, interns, and employees
in marginal part-time employment. All notifications on an individual’s employment or unemployment
spell can be linked via a unique person-specific identifier to construct the employment history for each
employee. Another identifier allows matching the employees to establishments. However, there is no
unique identifier to match establishments to firms. Therefore, we matched establishments to firms in
the IAB/ZEW Start-Up Panel using a text search algorithm via firm/establishment names and addresses.
The text search algorithm is described in detail in Appendix B of Czarnitzki et al. (2015) and has
proved to deliver very reliable results in various settings. In the matching procedure we were able to
find about 90% of the firms in the IAB/ZEW Start-Up Panel which reported having employees in the
yearly telephone surveys. We removed firms from the sample which reported that they had employees
but which we were unable to detect during the matching procedure. In addition, to safeguard against
false matches, all matches were double-checked manually and we excluded matches in the 1st and
100th percentile of the difference between self-reported and process-generated firm sizes from the
sample. The correlation coefficient between self-reported and process-generated firm sizes in the final
firm-year panel dataset is slightly above 0.95.
Since founders are usually not subject to social insurance contributions in their own companies,
they are not reported as employees of their ventures in the register data. Therefore, we matched labor
market histories of all founders from the IAB/ZEW Start-up Panel based on their names, birth dates,
and additional geographical information. We were able to find matching employment register data
for about 80% of the founders. Given that not all founders were necessarily employed, i.e. subject to
social insurance in Germany previously (e.g. as they have always been self-employed), this is a very
high ratio of matched individuals. Importantly, any bias due to unmatched individuals that might still
arise should be particularly small for unemployed founders, who are in the focus of this study. To
qualify for UI benefits, individuals need to have been previously employed subject to social insurance
(cf. Section 3.1). In addition, all spells with UI benefit receipts are observable in the register data.
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C Appendix: Institutional Details
C.1 Labour Market Reforms in Germany
In this paper, we exploit parts of the big labor market reforms enacted in Germany between 2003
and 2005 that are known as Hartz reforms (see e.g. Hartung et al. (2018), Petrunyk and Pfeifer (2018),
or Price (2019), who evaluate theses reforms).
• In 2003, the first two parts of the labor market reform were passed: the first measure (Hartz I)
liberalized temporary work, allowing firms to hire workers from temporary work agencies for
short-term periods. The second measure package (Hartz II) reduced the regulations on marginal
employment and introduced an additional form of social security tax-favored employment (midi-
jobs). Moreover, it created new subsidies for unemployed workers starting their own businesses
(Ich-AGs). The latter program ended in 2006 and was replaced by a new startup subsidy scheme
(Gründungszuschuss, see Appendix C.2).
• In 2004, the third reform package (Hartz III) renewed the structure and role of the German
Federal Employment Agency. Most importantly, the original placement agencies (Arbeitsämter)
and social security offices (Sozialämter) were merged into single institutions (Arbeitsagenturen).
Moreover, additional job centers were set up in many municipalities. Finally, case managers
were introduced to have one person in charge of assisting unemployed workers over the entire
job search process.
• In 2005, the last reform package (Hartz IV) transformed the three-tier system of unemploy-
ment benefits, unemployment assistance, and subsistence benefits into a two-tier system of
unemployment benefits and subsistence benefits.
– Concerning the benefit level, the reform involved abolishing unemployment assistance
benefits (Arbeitslosenhilfe). The unemployment assistance depended on some previous
work history and could be received for several years after unemployment insurance (UI)
benefits expired. The net replacement rates were at 53% for a single person and could
reach 57% for persons with dependent children. In addition, those who were not eligible
for unemployment assistance were still eligible to receive a minimum subsistence benefit
(Sozialhilfe) that included rent payments and was not dependent on previous wages. The
reform of 2005 removed wage-dependent benefits for long-term unemployed, and merged
unemployment assistance and subsistence benefits to create a new minimum benefit scheme
(Arbeitslosengeld II) that is independent of previous wages and only intended to provide
recipients with the minimum benefits necessary to survive. It is subject to a tight means
testing procedure. In contrast, the unemployment insurance (UI) benefits (Arbeitslosengeld
I) remained unchanged at a net replacement rate of 60% for single persons and 67%
for those with dependent children. Note that we only focus on individuals who enter
unemployment and receive UI benefits, thus, they were not affected by these benefit level
changes targeted at those having exhausted UI benefits.
– Moreover, the fourth reform package involved changing the duration of unemployment
benefits (see Table 7). These changes only came in effect for individuals claiming UI
benefits after February 1, 2006 and brought significant cuts in UI benefit durations for
individuals entering UI at an age above 45. Via our identification strategy, we exploit this
reform along with a later reform in 2008 that partially increased the UI benefit duration for
some older age groups of benefit claimants again (Lichter, 2016).
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Over the course of the labor market reforms, the German government also introduced two new
forms of government-funded/tax-subsidized private pension schemes. The so-called Riester Rente
became effective on the 1st of January 2002 and is mainly attractive for wage workers and public
servants with low to medium income. The so-called Rürup or Basis Rente became effective on the 1st
of January 2005 is attractive mainly for wage workers with high income and self-employed individuals.
Since we only analyse firm foundations from 2005 onwards, the availability of both schemes was
similar for all founders in our sample. In addition, eligibility for both pension plans is independent
of age and previous unemployment (duration) and hence should not interfere with our identification
strategy (see Section 3).
C.2 Startup Subsidies
This section provides an overview of startup subsidies in Germany. Importantly, with respect to our
identification strategy, all startup subsidies schemes were (and are) independent of the age of claimants
and were not subject to changes at the same time when the reforms of potential unemployment
insurance (UI) benefit duration (PBD) were introduced. Thus, the available startup subsidy schemes
should not interfere with our identification strategy that exploits policy changes in PBD (as explained in
Section 3). Moreover, we control for any funding provided by the German Federal Employment Agency
(Bundesagentur für Arbeit) and/or the state-owned KfW bank (the development bank Kreditanstalt
für Wiederaufbau, which was originally formed in 1948 to fund the reconstruction of Germany after
World War II). By controlling for funding by the Federal Employment Agency, we effectively control
for any startup subsidies targeted at founders starting a business out of unemployment. Funding via the
KfW is the most important channel through which startups in Germany are subsidized in general (i.e.
by subsidized credits that are administered and secured by KfW bank).
1. Bridging Allowance (BA) - “Überbrückungsgeld” (1986-07/2006)
• Eligibility: it covered individuals who were eligible for UI benefits, and presented an
externally approved business plan (issued by the regional chamber of commerce). It was
not possible to quit a job and directly apply for this bridging allowance.
• Amount: financial support was based on UI benefits plus social security contributions and
it could be provided for up to six months.
• Until 2002, individuals had to stay unemployed for a minimum of one month to apply for
BA. From 2002, one could apply for BA from the first unemployment day onward.
2. Existenzgründerzuschuss (Ich-AG) (startup subsidies (SUS)) (01/2003-06/2006)
• Eligibility: it covered individuals who were eligible for UI benefits, but also those with
means-tested social assistance or limited labor market experience (hence it was open to
more people than BA).
• Amount: it involved a monthly lump-sum payment for up to three years with 600 Euro
per month in the first year, 360 Euro per month in the second year, 240 Euro per month
in the third year. In contrast to BA, these startup subsidies were approved yearly if
self-employment income did not exceed 25,000 Euro per year.
• There was no need of business plans for approval, but parallel receipts of BA and SUS
were excluded.
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3. New SUS: new startup subsidy program (“Gründungszuschuss”) (08/2006-12/2011)
• Eligibility: it covered individuals that were unemployed for at least one day, eligible to
receive UI (Arbeitslosengeld I) and that still had at least 90 days of potential UI benefit
duration (PBD) left when making the transition from unemployment to self-employment.
Thus, it was not possible to get this startup subsidy when an unemployed worker just
exhausted her UI benefits.
• Amount: it involved UI benefits plus 300 Euro (for social security contributions) for nine
months. It was possible to get an extension of six months by proving that the business
is economically active. The amount of startup subsidies after the first nine months was
reduced to just 300 Euro for the remaining six months. In total the startup subsidies could
be taken for a maximum of 15 months.
• The first period of SUS could be legally claimed by all persons who fulfilled the legal
eligibility requirements. The second period was entirely subject to an assessment.
• In case of returning from self-employment to unemployment, the PBD would be reduced
by the number of months the person received SUS up to a minimum of zero PBD months.
4. New SUS adjusted: startup subsidy program (“Gründungszuschuss”) adjusted (01/2012-today)
• Eligibility: it covers individuals that are unemployed for at least one day, eligible to receive
UI (Arbeitslosengeld I) and that still have at least 150 days (instead of previously 90 days)
of potential UI benefit duration (PBD) left when making the transition from unemployment
to self-employment. Thus, it is not possible to get this startup subsidy when an unemployed
worker just exhausts her UI benefits.
• Amount: it involves unemployment insurance benefits plus 300 Euro (for social security
contributions) for six (instead of previously nine) months. It is possible to get an extension
of nine (instead of six) months by proving that the business is economically active. The
amount of startup subsidies after the first nine months is reduced to just 300 Euro for the
remaining six months. In total, the startup subsidies can be taken for a maximum of 15
months.
• The assessment for receiving startup subsidies has been extended to the first period. The
previous legal right to claim this subsidy has been abolished by December 2011 and is now
a subsidy that is available upon assessment of the caseworker at the federal employment
agency.
• Background: as part of public spending cuts, the intention was to reduce money allocated
for such active labor market policies.
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D Appendix: Model Extension
D.1 Model: Derivations and Details
The Effect of Unemployment Duration on the Value of Searching for Employment Starting
from the modeling framework as discussed in Section 5.1 with the value function of an unemployed
individual searching for employment (Equation (8)), we have:







V et+1(wt+1)dF(wt+1)+ [ptF(φt)+(1− pt)]V ut+1
}
(13)
This value function is increasing in the next period’s wage wt+1, such that the reservation wage
plays an important role in the optimal search behavior. Every wage that is larger than the reservation
wage, i.e. wt+1 ≥ φt , will be accepted. Therefore, we can write Equation (13) in terms of the following
Bellman equation as:
V eu,t = bt−ψt(st)+β
{










As mentioned in Section 5.1, pt = p(st ,θ). The case of leaving unemployment to employment is
dependent on the search intensity and an unemployed individual’s skill. Holding the level of ability θ
fix, pt is directly dependent on the search intensity st , and can be substituted accordingly.
Further, defining the discount factor β as 11+ρ , with ρ being the discount rate (see Schmieder and
von Wachter, 2016), one can rewrite Equation (14) to:














Assuming that the value of unemployment is in equilibrium equal to the discounted reservation
wage, we define V ut+1 =
1
ρ
φt . Analogously, the value of leaving unemployment in the next period
depends on the present value of the reservation wage V eu,t+1 =
1
ρ




Note that the individual is indifferent between leaving unemployment or staying unemployed at
the exact level of the reservation wage when V eu,t+1 =V
u
t+1. Knowing the reservation wage φt and the
optimal search intensity st in period t will enable us to detect the reservation wage in period t− 1.
Therefore, plugging in V ut+1 =
1
ρ
φt , V ut =
1
ρ





















Multiplying Equation (16) by ρ(1+ρ), we get:









To find the optimal reservation wage, we need to derive the first-order conditions. With the optimal
reservation wage implying indifference between the value functions for searching employment and
for remaining unemployed (when V eu,t+1 =V
u
t+1), we can further solve for the optimal search intensity
(taking the derivative of Equation (17) for st at the reservation wage φt−1):




[ρV et (wt)−φt−1]dF(wt) = 0 (18)
As mentioned in the main text, an unemployed individual receives a constant benefit bt for a
duration d. When t ≥ d = PBD, the benefit drops to a lower and constant level. This illustrates the
importance of duration d. Since the reservation wage and the optimal search intensity are two choice
variables that directly influence the value for employment, we are interested in their behavior over the
unemployment duration spell d.
Exploiting the fact V ut+1 =
1
ρ







Taking the total derivative of Equation (18) with respect to d, we get for the optimal search intensity









[ρV et (wt)−φt ]dF(wt)
(1+ρ)ρψ ′′t (st)
(20)
If there exists at least the slightest chance someone cannot find a job by the time unemployment




δd > 0. Equations (19) and (20) show that a longer d will lead to a higher
reservation wage φt and a lower search intensity st .
This means that given the hazard of leaving unemployment is given as ht = st(1−F(φt)), an
extension of PBD would lower the probability of leaving unemployment in that period, thus increasing
actual unemployment duration (compare also Schmieder and von Wachter, 2016). Moreover, this




|θ < 0 (21)
In other words, this model implies negative duration dependence which leads to the implications as
described in the main text in Section 5.
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The Effect of Unemployment Duration on the Value of Searching for Self-Employment Starting
from the modeling framework as discussed in Section 5.1 with the value function of an unemployed
individual searching for employment (Equation (10)), we have:







V set+1(πt+1)dF(πt+1)+ [ptF(φt)+(1− pt)]V ut+1
}
(22)
Giving the same importance to the reservation wage and using the same definition for β as in the
case before, holding θ fixed we can rewrite the above equation in terms of the following Bellman
equation as:
V seu,t = bt−ψset (st)+β
{












This value function is again increasing in the next period’s profits as income when being self-
employed πt+1. Every potential profit as self-employed that is larger than the reservation wage, i.e.
πt+1 ≥ φt , will be accepted. Note that the search costs have a different interpretation in this case. ψse
reflects costs related to developing a startup idea, doing the required research on it or finding capital.
Furthermore, defining the discount factor β as 11+ρ , with ρ being the discount rate, one can rewrite
Equation (23) to:




















it depends also on the probability of startup success (survival), here for the average type at θ̄ .
Note, that the individual is indifferent between leaving unemployment or staying unemployed at
the exact level of the reservation wage when V seu,t+1 =V
u
t+1. Knowing the reservation wage φt and the
optimal search intensity st in period t will enable us to detect the reservation wage in period t− 1.
Plugging in V ut+1 =
1−γ(θ̄)
ρ
φt , V ut =
1−γ(θ̄)
ρ
φt−1 into Equation (24), we get:
1− γ(θ̄)
ρ



















After some rearranging we get:
[1− γ(θ̄)](1+ρ)φt−1 = (1+ρ)ρ(bt−1−ψset (st))









To find the optimal reservation wage, we again need to derive the first-order conditions. With
the optimal reservation wage implying indifference between the value functions for becoming self-
employed and for remaining unemployed (when V seu,t+1 =V
u
t+1), we can further solve for the optimal






ρV set (πt)− (1− γ(θ̄))φt−1
]
dF(πt) = 0 (27)
As mentioned in the main text, an unemployed individual receives a constant benefit bt for a duration
d. When t ≥ d = PBD, the benefit drops to a lower and constant level. This illustrates the importance
of duration d. Since the reservation wage and the optimal search intensity are two choice variables that
directly influence the value for employment, we are interested in their behavior over the unemployment
duration spell d.
Exploiting the fact V ut+1 =
(1−γ(θ̄))
ρ


























Again when unemployment benefit duration increases and there is chance of not finding a job
when benefits expire, we expect that ∂V
u
t+1
∂d > 0. With ρ being the discount rate taking values < 1 and
[1−γ(θ̄)] being the probability of startup success that is higher than ρ , the whole fraction is ρ
(1−γ(θ̄)) <
1. The denominator becomes larger, the higher an individual’s ability θ . Equations (28) and (29) show
that searching market opportunities for self employment exhibits a smaller unemployment duration
dependence of the reservation wage path (∂φt
∂d ) and also a less negative duration dependence of the
search intensity path (∂ st
∂d ).
This implies that given Equation (22) the effect of unemployment duration on the value of searching








|θ < 0 (30)
In other words, this model implies negative duration dependence when searching for self-employment
out of unemployment, however, it is less negative than the duration dependence when searching for




larger than in the case of searching for employment, i.e. there is a higher UI duration elasticity - which
is in line with our empirical results in Section 4.
79
ZEW – Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische  
Wirtschaftsforschung GmbH Mannheim
ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European  
Economic Research
L 7,1 · 68161 Mannheim · Germany 
Phone  +49 621 1235-01  
info@zew.de · zew.de
Discussion Papers are intended to make results of ZEW 
research promptly avail able to other economists in order 
to encourage discussion and suggestions for revisions. 
The authors are solely respons ible for the contents which 
do not necessarily represent the opinion of the ZEW. 
IMPRINT
//
Download ZEW Discussion Papers from our ftp server:
http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/
or see:
https://www.ssrn.com/link/ZEW-Ctr-Euro-Econ-Research.html 
https://ideas.repec.org/s/zbw/zewdip.html
